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SOUT	ED STATES DISTRICT COURT HERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
In r	e GENERAL MOTORS LLC TION SWITCH LITIGATION	14 MD 2543 (JM
 Befo	x re:	New York, N.Y. July 6, 2017 9:30 a.m.
2010	HON. JESSE M.	FURMAN,
		District Judge
	APPEARANC	ES
BY: LIEF BY:	NS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP Co-Lead Plaintiff Counsel STEVE W. BERMAN -and- F CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN ELIZABETH J. CABRASER RACHEL GEMAN -and- IARD MUNOZ GONZALEZ LLP ROBERT C. HILLIARD	LLP
KIRK BY:	LAND & ELLIS LLP Attorneys for Defendant RICHARD C. GODFREY ROBERT C. BROCK ALLAN R. PIXTON	

(Case called) 1 2 (In open court) 3 MS. CABRASER: Good morning, your Honor. Elizabeth 4 Cabraser for plaintiffs. MR. BERMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Steve Berman. 5 6 MR. HILLIARD: Good morning, Judge. Bob Hilliard. 7 THE COURT: Good morning to all of you. MR. GODFREY: Your Honor, Rick Godfrey, Mike Brock, 8 9 Allan Pixton and Wendy Bloom for the MDL status. And then for 10 the Ward final pretrial we also have Mr. Sieve and Ms. Smith 11 will be coming up for that. 12 THE COURT: Good morning and welcome. 13 MR. HILLIARD: And for the Ward pretrial, for the 14 plaintiffs may I introduce from Weitz & Luxenberg, Paul Novak, 15 Nick Wise and James Bilsborrow, who will be lead counsel for the plaintiffs, and they will be presenting the pretrial issues 16 17 today after the status conference. 18 THE COURT: All right. Great. Am I right that this is Mr. Pixton's first time at counsel table? 19 20 MR. GODFREY: Yes. 21 THE COURT: He has earned it. 2.2 MR. GODFREY: We thought so too, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Congratulations or condolences, as the

Reminder as always to speak into the microphones.

case may be. All right. I think we're operational on Court

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Call.

So I think I had entered an order indicating that we would handle the MDL status conference first and then proceed to the final pretrial conference for Ward, after which I would meet with counsel in camera to discuss settlement-related issues.

I was thinking that it might make more sense to begin with the MDL status conference and then have the in camera meeting and after that proceed to the final pretrial conference, but I don't know if anyone has any views on that, or if there are lawyers on Court Call who are prepared and wanted to his listen to the final pretrial conference, if you have any thoughts.

MR. HILLIARD: That actually works better for the three of us, Judge, due to a scheduling issue we have elsewhere; and I haven't been advised that anyone on Court Call is interested in the Ward pretrial.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. BROCK: Mike Brock for GM. Same for the defense, your Honor, on folks who may potentially be joining by conference.

THE COURT: Great, then let's do it that way.

We have a lot of ground to cover, so let's start with the agenda items for the MDL writ large. Anything to discuss with respect to the first four items in the tentative agenda letter of June 30, that is, bankruptcy proceedings, coordination-related actions, document production and deposition update? Anything that we need to discuss there? Mr. Godfrey?

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MR. GODFREY: Thank you, your Honor. We have one concern with respect to the pending late claims motion in the bankruptcy court. We have learned that Magistrate Judge Cott is involved in some settlement discussions with I think designated counsel for plaintiffs. And if what he is discussing is a settlement of GUC claims and GUC assets alone, that's one thing, but if a settlement is being discussed which will implicate the accordion feature, then that's something else because that implicates new GM's rights.

So, we don't know the status of this -- we learned about his role yesterday -- but we think that a further discussion should be had on that. We're not quite sure how to proceed, but if what is taking place is a discussion between designated counsel and the GUC counsel -- which essentially is playing with new GM's assets -- we very much have an interest in that, to say the least.

So I think we need the court's guidance as to whether we should contact Magistrate Judge Cott, how should we proceed here. Because we have now learned about this, and we have concerns about the implications with respect to the accordion feature.

THE COURT: So, let me give you my understanding and

impression, and plaintiff's counsel can weigh in.

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My impression is I do understand that plaintiffs' counsel has contacted Magistrate Judge Cott to enlist his services, and he called me to ensure that it was OK with me, and I think Judge Glenn as well. It's an unusual situation because it concerns litigation not only here but also the bankruptcy court, but my view is that it is inextricably intertwined with the MDL and therefore proper for him to participate in.

My understanding -- and correct me if I'm wrong counsel at the front table -- is that he has been asked to sort of assist in -- assuming that there is a settlement, and assuming the settlement yields or results in a pot of money -- that he has been asked to assist you in essentially trying to figure out how much should be allocated to the economic loss plaintiffs or claims in this case as opposed to personal injury/wrongful death cases, which I guess would be part of whatever settlement or issues needed to be submitted to Judge Glenn.

Is that correct? And, if so, am I correct in assuming that it really doesn't concern new GM at all?

MR. BERMAN: Well, you're correct that we are discussing an allocation method with Judge Cott as the neutral between the economic loss and the personal injury claimants.

That part is correct.

With respect to the settlement, I think it's premature to discuss the terms of that settlement. If it does involve the accordion feature, and we present that to Judge Glenn, that would be the time when new GM can assert whatever rights it believes it has. I don't believe it has any under the agreement. It's a settlement between us and the PI plaintiffs and the economic loss plaintiffs and the GUC trust. New GM is not a party to the settlement, and we are proceeding pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement.

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THE COURT: All right. But as I understand it,

Mr. Godfrey was raising issues or concerns with respect to the
settlement discussions or whatever discussions are taking place
with Magistrate Judge Cott. I guess the question I have is the
GUC trust party to those discussions?

MR. BERMAN: Yes -- no, excuse me. It's just between Mr. Hilliard's clients and Ms. Cabraser and my clients.

THE COURT: OK. So I guess my question is: In light of that, is there any reason that new GM has any interest or need to be involved in that?

MR. BERMAN: I don't believe so.

THE COURT: Mr. Godfrey?

MR. GODFREY: I'm not sure I understand the answer.

The second half of the question goes to the nub of the issue,
which is if the negotiations that are taking place have the GUC
trust and essentially doing a deal whereby it is making

decisions that determine allocations of assets that belong to new GM via the accordion feature, then we very much have an interest.

THE COURT: My understanding is that those issues may well be implicated in a settlement, but you would have ample opportunity to address them and speak to them in the proceedings before Judge Glenn.

I think to the extent that -- and this isn't the proper forum to seek relief of that sort; you should address your concerns or issues with Judge Glenn -- to the extent you are raising concerns about not being in the room, so to speak, with Magistrate Judge Cott and his role here, I just don't understand how new GM would have an issue with that. It seems like an allocation issue among the plaintiffs. It may bear on new GM's liability to those plaintiffs ultimately, but presumably that would just be in the form of an offset, and therefore I don't see why you need to be in the room for those discussions.

MR. GODFREY: I think the court has raised a good point that we will reflect upon. We have learned something this morning that enhances our knowledge of what is taking place, and we will think about whether we need to raise this with Judge Glenn or whether we need to raise this with Magistrate Judge Cott. But I think I've got the answer to my question at least for now in terms of what the plaintiffs say

is the state of play.

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I think the court understands our concern, but we will think about this. As I say, I wanted to raise this because we heard about this yesterday and we want to think about what we just heard. And we will proceed after we give this some further thought.

THE COURT: All right. I think what I will do is after this conference or later today is just reach out to Magistrate Judge Cott and mention that you had expressed this concern and what I said in connection with it, and so he at least is sensitive to it and alert to it. If you feel the need to go beyond that and submit anything to either him or Judge Glenn or me, you know how to find all of us. So I will assume that that issue is addressed at this point.

Anything else that we need to discuss on those four items?

MR. GODFREY: Just as a matter of information, on the related case docket, we have the Ward trial coming up which the court knows about, but we are currently set to start the Orange County trial, the case brought by the Orange County district attorney on August the 14th.

I do not know, but I suspect there may be some issues that arise in that case that we might need to seek guidance from this court on, but I don't know that; I may be wrong on that. But I wanted the court to at least be aware that that

trial -- which will be a multi-week trial -- will be starting on August 14th in Orange County.

THE COURT: All right. You should be aware in that regard that I am out of the country from the night of August 15 until August 27. So in this world of technology, for better or for worse, I'm not necessarily inaccessible, but it will certainly not be easy for me to weigh in, let alone weigh in on anything particularly substantial. So if there are issues, I would strongly urge you to get them to me before I depart.

MR. GODFREY: And I will strongly urge the team that will be trying it with me not to bother you on vacation, but I just thought the court in fairness ought to know this trial is set.

THE COURT: Fair enough. And in fairness you should know I will be out of the country.

All right. Anything else? Very good.

So let's turn to item five, which is the status of the economic loss motion practice and discovery. So, to the extent that you were wondering whether or when I was going to rule on the motion to dismiss, I have answered that uncertainty.

I'm sorry that it took me so long to give you a ruling, but I have been really underwater for the last few months not only with this litigation, which takes its toll, but with the other several hundred cases that I have. And, believe me, I would have gotten it out sooner if I could have, but you

also saw from the opinion itself it was not exactly a small undertaking.

I also apologize for the fact that I dumped it on all of you at 5:30 or thereabouts on a holiday weekend. I recognize I might have ruined some people's weekends, and I apologize for that. I did so in part to get it out of my hair before the holiday weekend, but I also wanted to give you at least a little bit more time to absorb it than you would have had if I had filed it yesterday, which was the next day the court was open. So, I apologize for that, and particularly to any associates whose weekends I may have ruined.

With that, let's talk about where things stand. I recognize that we still have the -- or I still have the successor liability summary judgment motion pending. I have not decided that for a couple of reasons. One, there is only so much that I can take care of at once and, as I indicated, between this case and the rest of my docket, I am I think at capacity or maybe above it at the moment.

On top of that, that motion is not a modest undertaking either, because for reasons I'm likely to explain, I think it probably requires me to delve into the application of the choice of law law in if not all of the states implicated by the motion, certainly some number of them, which is another way of saying that I am inclined at least at this point to reject new GM's arguments concerning application of federal

choice of law rules or its alternative arguments that the choice of law rules in one state should apply.

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On top of that, my sense is that the train here is a little bit in flux with the potential settlement between the plaintiffs and the GUC trust, for example, which may have a bearing on the issues addressed in the motion, and I guess one question I have is whether that is true, whether it does have a bearing on it, whether you have already addressed the potential bearing of any such settlement in the supplemental briefing that you submitted with respect to the motion for leave to file late claims, or whether additional briefing would be appropriate in the event that there actually is a settlement and a pot of money that the settlement yielded.

Bottom line, for all of those reasons I haven't yet given you a decision. I also don't have a sense -- and I would love to get one here -- of how big an issue this is with respect to moving matters forward either with respect to litigation or settlement.

So, that is by way of I guess an invitation for you to tell me your thoughts on where things are, where I can push or pull to help move things along most effectively and so forth.

So, Mr. Berman, you look like you were getting up.

MR. BERMAN: I'm pausing because --

THE COURT: Just move the microphone a little closer, please.

MR. BERMAN: We're still digesting the implications of your order on motion to dismiss and what we do next. For example, are we going to brief 35 more states? That decision also intertwines with class certification, because if we're going to move for class certification on the remaining states, it seems to me there has to be some pleading motions perhaps logically to precede that, because you're not going to want to move for state certification in a state you've dismissed the claims in.

So, I know we addressed the issue of what states should be next in line for class certification in our letter, but Ms. Cabraser and I were thinking that that should be part of the meet and confer. In other words, what we should be doing in the next three weeks is looking at the whole economic loss case, looking at the states that have not been addressed and coming up with a plan, a comprehensive plan for everything.

THE COURT: All right. That certainly seems fair to me, and per some numbered order a while ago I had told you to submit within three weeks of my decision on the motion to dismiss your thoughts. So, as I made clear in my order on Friday, I do not expect you to be prepared to address that in any detail, and I do think it requires some careful consideration and conferring with one another.

Let me tell you all -- I should have probably added this in my preliminary remarks -- you can have a seat for a

moment -- just sort of where I stand in the big picture, because it may have some bearing on those discussions.

To be completely blunt, I am not at all eager to invite motion to dismiss practice with respect to another 35 states. To be completely candid, you know, these two motions to dismiss have taken their toll on me and on my chambers. I think they have collectively required something in the nature of 260 pages of opinions.

As you've seen, I think it really does require careful evaluation of the law in each of these states, and it's just a huge undertaking, and I'm not sure that that is the most efficient way forward either for my chambers or, more to the point, for the MDL writ large. That isn't to say that it won't ultimately be necessary. It may well be. And obviously I'm prepared to do whatever I need to do to get this case across the finish line, whatever that finish line ultimately looks like.

But given the amount of resources that the parties have to devote to those motions, and the amount of resources that my chambers has to devote to them, I'm inclined to think that some other way forward that would focus on the 16 jurisdictions that I have already addressed in those rulings would probably make more sense. I don't know if that means class certification practice that is devoted to those 16 or some subset of those 16, followed perhaps by a bellwether trial

if there is no settlement. I think Mr. Berman had in a prior conference floated that idea. It just seems like that may be a more efficient way to go forward than essentially motion practice on the other 35 states.

Alternatively -- and notwithstanding the fact that I have found that there are subtle and nuanced differences between the states on these issues -- maybe you guys can essentially negotiate and agree on how the remaining 35 states fall in the buckets that I have identified in these rulings and sort of, you know, place them in each of the buckets as appropriate.

Relatedly I'm not at all eager on class certification -- well, on class certification I'm not particularly eager to entertain serial motions there either, and in that regard it would favor new GM's view on the matter, but my concern is that proceeding in one comprehensive motion with respect to all 51 jurisdictions, if it would require motion practice on the pleadings with respect to the other 35, would not necessarily be efficient for the reason I have already discussed.

So, all that is to say that I think my inclination would be to figure out some sensible way forward based on the rulings that you've already gotten, but recognizing that at the end of the day -- whether that's next year, the year after, or who knows when -- that it may not be up to me, and I may need

to resolve things in those remaining states.

MR. BERMAN: Can I just add one thing, your Honor? If you took the transcript from the Toyota case and compared it to what you just said, it's the same reaction the judge had. He came out and said my chambers can't handle it; I can't handle, it; we're not going to do another 35 states, and then we proceeded to do a bellwether approach for the rest of the case.

Now, we are going to obviously discuss it with new GM, but other judges had the same reaction.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm not ruling on these issues now. I recognize that might be a thumb -- and a heavy one at that -- on the scales, but I did think it would make sense to share it with you. And at the end of the day I can handle additional motion practice. It's just my guess would mean this litigation is going to last, you know, many more years, because each of these motions takes a substantial amount of time in its own right, and I have addressed only 16 of the 51 jurisdictions thus far.

So, Mr. Godfrey, anything you want to say at this time? Otherwise, you know, it seems like you guys have a lot to chew on and discuss with one another, and we should take this up at a next conference, whenever that may be.

MR. GODFREY: Well, we do have a lot to discuss with the plaintiffs. We have given a great deal of thought about this prior to the court's ruling. So, in the interest of full disclosure or a marker, let me give you some preliminary thoughts for your consideration and the plaintiffs as well.

First, we ought to note as a result of the motion practice, and the discovery to date, that 122 of the 246 named plaintiffs in the fact are now gone, so 49.59 percent of the named plaintiffs are gone.

So, I know the court sometimes when you issue these rulings kind of wonders what it actually means in terms of the progress of the litigation, but what it means is we have tracked it out, and nearly half the plaintiffs' claims have been dismissed or have been dropped, and that's progress of a material sort.

Second, I think that the court and Mr. Berman both have a fair point with which we are going to endeavor to try to work through, that there are buckets of issues that can be identified that if the parties can agree could both abbreviate or perhaps eliminate briefing on motions to dismiss. Examples would be manifest defect rule. In footnote 18 of the court's opinion you have indicated a majority of the states have it; that means a strong minority don't. We ought to be able to agree, I would think, between the plaintiffs and us as to which states are like Texas and New York and which states are, for example, like one of the other states where the court has disagreed with new GM on. Maybe we can't agree on all of them, but I would hope that if we can't agree on all of them, we

could narrow the field of disagreement so that we're not going to brief the same issue for another 36 jurisdictions, which I think is the court's concern, and I think that we would try to avoid.

Similarly, on incidental consequential damages, the court rejected our categorical motion on that, but said some states will allow, some states will not. We have never briefed that, but again I think the parties would start by saying is it possible for us to reach an agreement that the following six states allow it — if the court's ruling on categorical rejection is the ruling — or these states don't allow it.

Maybe we can't get anywhere, but there are buckets of these things where I think we can identify what the states and the differences in the states are, and maybe that way have an expedited or accelerated briefing so you're not briefing another 36 jurisdictions; you're briefing maybe four or five, which I think would make it much easier for the court and much easier for us.

There is a third issue which is the benefit of the bargain theory. That is the heart of this case at this point in time. We have never explored with the court what the elements of the benefit of the bargain theory are. And we are discussing it internally and then we will discuss with plaintiffs what we think is the best way to get to that.

We happen to think that based on the discovery to date

and the pleadings to date that the benefit of the bargain theory here yields nothing because of certain admissions that have been made by the plaintiffs and the law in the various jurisdictions. I am sure the plaintiffs disagree. That is a finite, concrete legal issue that I do not think will depend upon disputed facts. Plaintiffs may disagree with that. But that's something that we are taking a hard look on as a way of both identifying an overarching issue but also accelerating an end game resolution possibility.

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Because if we're right on that, then the number of plaintiffs that remain in the case are very few; there could never be a class. If we're wrong on that, that will inform the contours of the litigation. But it is certainly something the court has not had the benefit of any briefing on.

So the court has said I'm going to allow in various states the benefit of the bargain theory. The court has never explored — because we have not asked the court, nor have the plaintiffs asked the court — to explore what the elements of that claim are in the various states and what the implications are either on the merits of the claim or for class certification. And it seems to me that prior to class certification, that is a theory that needs to be spelled out.

The final comment goes to the class. I think that successor liability, for example, is something that we need to know before we get to class certification. I think I heard

Mr. Berman say that. If I did, then he and I are in agreement on that. If he didn't say it, then I misunderstood. But I think that's something that is necessary to understand what the contours of any putative class motion would be, and it's also necessary to understand the putative end game resolution possibilities. Are those claims of those people in? Are those claims of those people out? And of course if your Honor is going to do as you indicated preliminary a state-by-state analysis, ultimately does it depend upon the individual states?

And the only other comment I would make is I think the court's idea on a chart or summary -- I say an order of the court, but a prepared chart or summary -- is a very good idea that will help I think frame the next steps.

I'm not sure all the elements that need to be in that chart. We have tried to start to sketch that out. Obviously that's a joint enterprise. But I think it will not only be helpful for the court, but I think it will be helpful for the parties in terms of what is the next best appropriate step.

Obviously, the court understands our position on the class, it should not be seriatim; we should do this one time and one time only. We have disagreement with the plaintiffs on that. But I think the starting point is successor liability and then these finite issues, to see if there is a path forward that does not overburden the court with, you know, motions of the type you have now written 200 some pages on, which are very

detailed motions and rulings and that require a deep investigation of the law by the court.

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I'm hoping that we can reach agreement on some of the issues I identified and some others. Maybe we can't, but I think that's where we should put our efforts.

THE COURT: Neither of you addressed the question that I posed about any potential settlement on the claims motion with the GUC trust and what bearing that would have on the successor liability motion and more specifically whether it would warrant any additional briefing or your prior briefing in connection with my order asking you to submit supplemental briefs would adequately address that issue.

MR. BERMAN: I have to think about that issue. I don't want to answer it on the fly, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. BERMAN: If that's OK.

THE COURT: Totally OK.

MR. BERMAN: Maybe we could get you a letter on that if you want.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you, Mr. Godfrey, if you want, maybe it does make sense for both of you to talk about that issue as well and let me know on that sooner rather than later, just so I know essentially where things stand on this.

I mean I'm hearing Mr. Godfrey say loud and clear --

and, Mr. Berman you didn't opine, but I'm guessing you agree —
that a decision on that motion is important both for class
certification and for any potential resolution here. Is that
accurate?

MR. BERMAN: I agree with Mr. Godfrey.

THE COURT: So mindful of that, the sooner you let me know whether supplemental briefing is appropriate and make a proposal on that score -- or your view that it's not and I have what I should need to resolve those issues -- that would be helpful to me. I'm not going to -- well, why don't you aim to get that within a week or so, and we will go from there.

I think the last report I got regarding the settlement discussions suggested that it would be another couple weeks before there was any -- I don't know where those things stand. Maybe it pays to wait and see if there actually is a settlement.

MR. BERMAN: I think if there is a settlement, I would hope that you would know that and Judge Glenn would know that within two weeks.

THE COURT: OK.

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MR. BERMAN: That's our goal.

THE COURT: And is there any reason to wait until we know that to opine on these issues? I wouldn't think.

MR. BERMAN: I don't think sol. That's the question you're asking me, does the settlement somehow moot the

successor liability issue, and I just want to think about that. You kind of caught me off quard.

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THE COURT: No, no, I understand that. My question is: Is there any reason to wait until we know whether there is a settlement for you to submit a letter to me telling me additional briefing or what bearing --

MR. BERMAN: I think that would be a good idea to wait.

THE COURT: Mr. Godfrey is shaking his head no.

MR. GODFREY: I don't see the need to wait. For one thing, we don't really know the timing of it. For another thing, there is an approval process for any settlement. And my reaction to this is that we should be able to tell the court now in quick order, certainly within a week, whether we think there is more briefing.

If a settlement changes things -- which I suspect it doesn't -- we can have a so-called brief at that time. But I don't think we should wait on settlement that may or may not come, with terms we do or do not know and we can speculate about, but all it does is build delay into the system, which I don't think is consistent with the court's goal of a reasonable yet aggressive schedule.

THE COURT: I think that's right. I think you can essentially submit a joint letter to me saying assuming there is a settlement, here are our thoughts about how to deal with

it, whether supplemental briefing is appropriate. If it is, I wouldn't want to waste the next couple of weeks -- squander the last couple weeks and have you start to think about that and we can proceed accordingly.

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So give me a joint letter within a week on that issue. And, just to be clear, it's really whether I have what I need, whether additional briefing would be appropriate and, if so, make a proposal on that score.

There is also I guess under this umbrella of where things stand on the economic loss front the question of I guess the current schedule set forth in order number 114 including discovery and motion practice and what have you. I would think that that's within the scope of whatever discussions you are going to have and, therefore, we shouldn't get into the particulars now. Is that a fair thing to say?

That is to say, I think we should defer until you've had an adequate amount of time to absorb the rulings and discuss these issues with one another to really get into the weeds of whether the schedule that we have set requires modifications. But if you think we should get into some of that now, let me know.

MR. BERMAN: From plaintiffs' perspective, we could wait on the schedule until we either agree with new GM or we come back to the court with competing views on where we go from here.

THE COURT: All right, great.

So under the ruling of last week and the prior order, you had three weeks I think to report back to me, so I will leave that deadline in effect and trust that I will hear from you in that time. Yes?

MR. BERMAN: Yes, your Honor. Sorry to raise another issue, but Mr. Godfrey was talking about the buckets as he sees them. And I know he put a lot of work into the motion to dismiss, and we all respect that on our side of the V, but there is one area that we're going to move to reconsider on, and I just wanted to let you know that that would be coming so you weren't surprised by it.

It has to do with your categorical dismissal of plaintiffs who sold their cars prior to the recall. And you seemed to say in your order that those people could not have suffered any diminished value as a result of disclosure of the defect, which I understand how one could reach that conclusion.

But, as Mr. Godfrey pointed out, the plaintiff's theory of the case is at the time of sale you were defrauded and you lost the benefit of the bargain. And that applies to anyone regardless of whether they held their car through the defect or sold prior to the recall. At the time of the sale they were defrauded and they overpaid.

And at the trial we're going to put on an economist that will do what is called a conjoin analysis that will

measure that delta between a car that supposedly was safe and a car that wasn't. So I'm just letting you know that that's coming.

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THE COURT: OK. Well, I appreciate the heads-up, and I will look for that. Obviously you should address not only why you think I got it wrong but why there is an adequate basis to reconsider. I may well have gotten it wrong, but you have other recourse, namely appellate review for that.

So, you will have to persuade me not only that I got it wrong but that I overlooked something that would warrant reconsideration under the standards that apply to such motions.

Now, Mr. Godfrey, you stood up and then sat down.

MR. GODFREY: I had second thoughts and decided to sit down, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, very good.

So, we will essentially table the issues that are raised by my ruling and discussed in item number five in your letter until I think I hear from you and presumably the next conference which we will schedule in short order.

The number six is briefing in connection with Ward, which I defer until the final pretrial conference. There is no reason to discuss that in this setting. Item seven is the status of bellwether trial number nine. Anything to discuss on that? No?

MR. GODFREY: I think our position is laid out in the

papers, your Honor.

THE COURT: Unless I'm confused --

MR. GODFREY: If you're referring to -- oh, you're referring to Dodson.

THE COURT: Yes. I don't think there are any positions to be had there. The scheduled is set by order 123.

I do have one question with respect to the scheduling of the trial, and I don't know if you will be in a position to give me your thoughts at this time.

unfortunately -- and maybe ironically -- the annual MDL conference for judges was scheduled to begin on the same day as the Dodson trial on October 30, and it runs until November 2.

Now, in an ideal world I would really like to attend it. I think it's actually a helpful conference and very specifically helpful in connection with this litigation, but it would mean postponing the beginning of trial until Thursday, I guess, November 3.

My concern is that I don't really want to risk the possibility of the trial continuing through Thanksgiving. I think that would make it a little bit more challenging to seat a jury and not ideal to take a five day break over the Thanksgiving holiday. It may be necessary, but it may be necessary even if we start on October 30.

I guess I just wanted to raise it or float it as a

question and see if you had any thoughts about how inadvisable it would be to postpone the start until that Thursday.

MR. HILLIARD: Judge, I'm going to be trying that case for the plaintiffs, and I don't think, given my experience with the court in the first trial, that there is a true realistic danger of going through Thanksgiving, especially given the number of bellwethers we have tried and the cooperation that we have been able to both give and get from GM. I encourage you to go.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Brock, you were going to stand. Just grab the microphone, please.

MR. BROCK: Yes, your Honor. Mike Brock for GM. May I ask one question? Would the idea be that we would pick a jury and maybe take the longer day on Thursday and get the opening statements in, and we would have the trial underway on the — would that be the 2nd? December the 2nd? Or the 3rd, that Thursday? So the trial would be underway that week in terms of picking a jury, making opening statements, maybe a day of evidence, and then we would come back and have a full week and then another full week.

THE COURT: Yes, so basically it would simply shift things by three days. So, under the current schedule I think jurors would be filling out their questionnaire the prior week, prior Wednesday if I'm not mistaken, and then we would reconvene the morning of November 2nd -- as we are going to on

Monday for the Ward trial -- finish the selection of the jury, and assuming that we seat the jury in time, proceed to openings that day and potentially even a first witness if things go quickly enough. And certainly I would anticipate by Friday the 3rd we would be into the evidentiary portion of the case. So it would really be shifting it by three days.

MR. BROCK: I agree with Mr. Hilliard, I think we will be finished by Thanksgiving if we pursue that schedule. I think we're to a place now in these trials — I mean something different could happen somewhere along the way — but they feel like trials that would be completed in two weeks or two weeks plus a day or two, so I think that sounds fine.

THE COURT: All right. I'm inclined to agree, and I will be addressing this during the final pretrial conference.

One issue I have is I actually think there is a danger of overtrying these cases and you are asking for too much time. I will be addressing that in due course as to Ward. But for related reasons, I don't see any reason why we couldn't get the trial in and done before Thanksgiving, and if it spilled into the following week, so be it.

But in light of that, I think I will go to the conference and adjust the start date to November 2. Otherwise, the trial schedule will remain as it is.

All right. That brings us to the category C replacement issue. Let me start by saying the following. So

I'm not really interested in playing the blame game, that is to say who settled what or who is doing what. Really the primary question -- maybe the only question in my mind -- is what would be the most helpful in resolving the remaining cases in the MDL or in this particular instance the cases that fall in category C of the second phase of the bellwether process.

At the same time -- and consistent with what I said earlier about the burdens of this litigation writ large -- I'm not eager to try cases solely for the sake of trying cases. You know, these aren't particularly easy trials, as fun as they are, and at some point my function here is to try and facilitate resolution of these cases, and at some point I think it would make more sense, as I've said before, to send them back from whence they came to be tried for any number of reasons, that that would ultimately be more efficient if I can't assist you in getting across the finish line here as to all cases.

I guess that leaves me essentially trying to figure out what the right thing is here, whether it's necessary to have another case in the mix. I'm wondering for new GM why new GM took a different view as to the category A cases back in January — that's at docket number 3644 — at which point new GM took the view that it wasn't necessary to add any category A cases to the mix. Relatedly, I'm wondering why, to the extent that part of the purpose here is to sort of accumulate data on

these cases and to assist in purposes of settlement, why the discovery that has been done in connection with the six cases already selected for category C wouldn't essentially give you what you need on that front.

On the flip side, my question for Mr. Hilliard or the plaintiffs is obviously if cases are not settled they will ultimately need to be tried, whether that is here or in the transferor districts, and given that, and given new GM's view that what it has at the moment doesn't suffice for its purposes in terms of resolving all of the cases that are pending before me, why shouldn't I defer to new GM's view that an additional trial would be helpful in connection with those settlement discussions?

On top of all that, I guess I really want to delve into if I did allow new GM to pick a replacement case, whether the January trial date is a viable one. I certainly think my preference would be to keep it if we go that route, but, if not, I would think that it wouldn't have to be long thereafter, and it certainly wouldn't have to be well beyond February 2018, to use, I think terminology from a prior order of mine.

So, that's my initial thinking. Obviously, as you can see, I'm sort of unresolved on how to come out here, and I wanted to discuss it.

Mr. Hilliard, why don't I start with you.

MR. HILLIARD: Well, Judge, as you know, we're here

until last call, so if the court wants to try it, we're going to come try it, and we will be happy to do it. But what I explained to GM is it's run its course. If it goes back to its home venue, then it serves a different purpose than it serves as a bellwether case.

They through their own abilities have shown that they can settle big buckets of cases around the country. They have told the court and me that part of the purpose is to show they're willing to try cases within liability; and they have a track record for that. So, I think that message has been sent, and it has assisted them in settling state court cases in pretty high levels, which I applaud them for doing.

And we do cooperate and try to agree on issues like this. Had this happened early on, had it been the first case, we would not even be speaking with you about it.

My hesitation is I don't think it's necessary in order to inform the docket, in order to make decisions or to encourage unknown plaintiffs lawyers somewhere else to perhaps negotiate.

And in the same breath I'm more than happy to come try whatever case is picked in front of this court, if the court feels that one more category C bellwether case is necessary. I would suggest it would be a judicial waste of time and resources to do another case, but we would commit to it, just as I know you would, and GM would, and we would get through it,

but I would really hope that you would think about do we really need it and is it really going to move the ball any further than the ball already sits.

THE COURT: And just taking a step back or a step up to the 30,000 foot level, where do you see the personal injury/wrongful death cases headed after phase 2 is done, which is supposed to be early next year?

MR. HILLIARD: You've asked us to start trying to figure out where this docket is going to go. And if the entirety of the remaining MDL cases do not get resolved, then there has to be a mechanism where you determine where to send them and where they belong.

Remember, many of these cases were directly filed, and we had indicated a couple status conferences ago that we were happy to keep trying them here, but that was a one to one vote on that issue.

So, we have started to think about and we will get with GM on the remaining cases inside your MDL, what federal court should they be remanded to given where the accident happened and where the plaintiffs live. And I would believe that we could suggest to you, if the cases are not resolved, here is where they need to be remanded to, and then the court will make its decision on where they go and when they go there, which I think is what ultimately you're leading to is if the MDL has led a full life and is ready to be done, then the

remaining cases still have to go be tried just for the liability and damages of those cases, not to inform the entirety of the docket. And, you know, it's a pretty straightforward process even on the direct filed cases that I'm sure GM and I can agree as to where they go.

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THE COURT: All right. I certainly agree on that score. And I guess the question I had -- and maybe you implicitly answered it -- is do you think that there is a third phase of bellwethers that would be warranted here?

I'm looking at new GM's letter of February 24th, which provided an inventory of cases remaining in the MDL and settlement and the like, and among other things at page 3 of that letter there are five categories of cases that new GM describes as not falling within either phase 1 or phase 2. I don't know if there is anything I can do to facilitate resolution of those cases beyond what's already been done or what you're thinking on that score.

MR. HILLIARD: Those would almost in the category of one-off type cases. If GM has determined that they have no value or we're going to try each one specific to the facts of the accident, I don't believe that a bellwether verdict would change their mind.

I'm happy to sit down with them and try to come to an agreement as to if there are any, which ones on that list could use the court's assistance under the MDL umbrella.

But my first reaction is, you know, the majority of the ignition switch core and kind of the penumbra of the core cases have now been bellwethered, and we understand them and it's worked. The cases have started to settle on a pretty significant level around the country, and the ones that did not get settled will likely not get settled. And there is no reason to expect that you have any interest in continuing to try those cases when they're one-off facts that might not have the liability evidence necessary to convince GM that as a docket those types of cases should settle.

THE COURT: All right. And just looking back at that letter, I'm seeing some of these categories I think clearly would not be appropriate for additional bellwethers. One is presale order claims. I think we have discussed those before. While they're obviously not within the scope of either of the bellwether phases, I don't see them as categorically different from the cases that have been tried. It's just a question of what date the accident or incident occurred.

MR. HILLIARD: May I speak to that real quick?

Because that is one issue you asked us to look at, and that is the docket that is now because of the Second Circuit's opinion going to need to be either settled or sent back sooner rather than later because they've been bellwethered -- I mean both sides agree there is nothing else this court can do unless there is a facilitation of settlement -- which you said, if

there is, I'll keep them so that we can simply in due course get it done. But if there is not, I would suggest the court consider setting a date after which you want to know when do you want these sent back and where do I send them, and we give you that information. Because, you know, those clients are real people who have suffered injury and death, and they're ready for some finality themselves.

THE COURT: Understood. And certainly that is an issue I've raised before and was planning to raise in connection with the next item on our agenda, namely settlement. But all I was simply saying is that of the five categories I referenced before, several of them are definitely not amenable to further bellwether phases. There is one just for plaintiffs whose claims where they have claims where the accident date is unknown, but that obviously is not something that needs to be bellwethered, so to speak.

All right. Mr. Godfrey, do you have anything you want to say on this?

MR. GODFREY: I'll try to address what I think were the court's two questions. First, why the differentiation between new GM's position with the category A versus category C? And the answer is simple: At the time that we made that decision — which we debated internally fairly hotly — we concluded we had enough discovery and that we knew enough about the category A cases from the plaintiffs' side that a

substitute case was not necessary to assist us in reaching our assessments. That's not the case -- or situation, excuse me -- with category C. Category C is the largest of the remaining categories, and that's why we draw the distinction. So I hope that answers the court's first question.

With respect to category C, because it is the largest remaining category, we think that the balance of the selections is important to test the parameters of what reasonable settlements can and cannot be.

Mr. Hilliard is correct, we have been able to reach many settlements in a cooperative basis. They're not easy to reach. The negotiations are very precise and contentious, as you would expect but always professional, but we don't think that category C is yet at the mature stage that category A was at the time we made the decision.

In terms of the issue of remand --

THE COURT: Hold on. On that issue, can you -- maybe it's not possible -- but can you flesh that out a little more? Other than the sheer number of cases in the categories -- and if your letter of February 24 is an indication, at least at that time there was 331 plaintiffs remaining in category C and 114 in category A. I don't know if you know what the current numbers on that are. But other than the sheer number, why is what you have on category C not essentially sufficient or mature enough, if you will, to give you what you need?

MR. GODFREY: Category A was of course was the service parts recall, which there is much more discovery on than category C.

The current number, I have 226, but I'm not sure that -- post-bankruptcy 226 is category C, give or take a few.

OK? As the court knows, these things vary by day a little bit. But the emergence curve, if you will, in terms of the number of new cases, as the court also knows, has declined over time, as one would expect. So roughly 226, something in that area.

That's the best answer I can give to the court from discussions with the team. Obviously the plaintiffs may have a different view, and we respect that, but we just disagree from a balance standpoint in terms of selecting here that will give us the most information.

In terms of the remand issue, which I was starting to get to, there is two aspects to that which lead us to conclude it's premature. One is this court's direction, orders and guidance has been a material benefit I think to both parties in terms of understanding how to proceed, when to proceed and how to resolve claims. I think Mr. Hilliard would agree with that. I think he said the same thing roughly in different words. And by remanding cases prematurely, we lose that, and it ends up burdening other judges and will lead to, I think, inefficient results given the number of claims that still remain total.

Secondly, for these other claims there are some broad

legal issues we think that motion practice will dictate in large measure, we hope — could be wrong — the ultimate outcome either by resolution or by decision. And while we've not yet reached the stage at which those would be briefed, we think that's important because we think that for the same reason there is an MDL to begin with, the consistent application of the rules of law will be of material benefit to resolving those claims whether it's by settlement or by resolution. I think that's for a later day, but again in fairness to the court, so you understand new GM's position on that, that's how we think about this.

I'm trying to think, were there any other questions in that long colloquy you had with Mr. Hilliard that I haven't answered? I think I've answered them all, but if not, I apologize.

THE COURT: Let me give you a couple more to ponder then.

Number one, the reasons — and this is bleeding into the next issue on our agenda about settlement — but with respect to the issue of remand, what I heard you just say is that my rulings have been helpful to the parties and to other courts and what have you, and that you would anticipate that my rulings in connection with motions in the upcoming cases would also be helpful.

I guess just to push back on that a little bit,

presumably that would only apply to cases that are in phase 2 of the bellwether, which raises the question in my mind as to whether there is anything further to be gained by keeping the phase 1 bellwether cases here.

In other words, I don't think I need to say the MDL, it's not an either/or, light on/light off determination I can presumably decide as to some subset of the full universe of cases that remand is appropriate and continue with respect to others, all of which is I guess just to pose a question, you know, might it be appropriate to remand the phase 1 cases sooner than the phase 2 cases, even if there is more to be done on the phase 2 front.

And I do think that Mr. Hilliard's point -- I mean as I've said before, I am amenable to keeping these cases here as long as I think the ball is moving forward in some fashion or another, but I'm also acutely mindful of the fact that behind each and every one of these cases there is a person, and I don't know how old those people are but, you know, they have an interest in finality; they have an interest in obtaining recovery sooner if they're going to recover; and in that regard it's not fair to them to keep them stuck here and not moving their individual cases forward if there is nothing material to be gained by keeping them here. So that's one question.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ GODFREY: That was a long question, so I will try to --

THE COURT: I can be a little wordy, as you know.

MR. GODFREY: No, no, it's not that. A couple of thoughts. One, I don't think breaking up the MDL by phases in terms of remand is going to advance the ball as a practical matter or a theoretical matter. Let me deal with the theoretical matter first and practically second.

THE COURT: All right, but loudly and slowly.

MR. GODFREY: Sure. At the level of theory, the court's orders even on phase 2 have implications that extend sometimes beyond phase 2. And we also have, as the court knows, the economic loss class actions where there is substantial overlap on core issues. So, one way one looks at it or not, the core issues of the MDL remain here, and so the remaining phase 1 cases, it's not going to do on a theoretical level anything other than, I think create the risk of inconsistencies in the near term.

At the practical level, I share the court's concern. I mean my client would like to resolve this sooner rather than later as well. If these are remanded to the state courts, effectively they start from scratch, and the ability to have aggregate settlements, the ability to have smaller group settlements, the ability even to have one-off settlements becomes much more challenging from I think both the plaintiffs' perspective but also from the new GM perspective.

So, there is a practical aspect here where I think

that a remand prematurely -- which I think this will be -- will actually add delay into the system. And I also think it does not address the consideration that the court is issuing rulings all the time and will be in connection with economic loss that bear on phase 1 issues.

The other aspect of this that I would say is I have been pleased and surprised -- I don't know what Mr. Hilliard thinks about this -- but I think that the court's management of this has stimulated outreach to us from various plaintiff's counsel that I don't think would take place necessarily if certain cases were spread to the wind.

There is an understanding that the court is managing a set of common issues from the court's perspective pursuant to the MDL orders, and as a result Ms. Bloom spends a great deal of time fielding calls and working through, as the court will hear in chambers I think in some detail, buckets, one-offs, groups, that I think will prove far more difficult if there is a premature remand.

So, if we step back and say what's best from the judicial system and the plaintiffs writ large -- and people may disagree with us, but I'm speaking from the new GM perspective -- the management of this MDL -- which may seem like a lifetime, but this is actually only year three coming up this August -- has resolved masses of claims that, A, other MDLs, I think, would like to have done but didn't do and, B,

that I do not think would have taken place had you remanded a bunch of cases last year, for example.

So we have a track record here. The track record is a very beneficial track record for the judiciary writ large, I think for the parties in this case, and I think for the parties who have not yet resolved. I think the best hope in the near term for the remaining cases is to keep the matters here.

We want the opportunity, for example, to settle as much here as possible, and we think this is the most efficient way to do it under the court's guidance and direction, and so far I think the track record proves us correct.

At the end there may be a small number of cases where it is what it is, and the court will then at that time make the appropriate decision, but I think it's premature for the reasons I outlined.

(Continued on next page)

THE COURT: Thank you. That is helpful.

I would say flattery gets you nowhere, but it may succeed in buying you more time here.

MR. GODFREY: Facts are facts.

THE COURT: The last question for you is if I did agree to your request to select a category C replacement, and I think I am leaning in that direction, what is your view on the viability of a January trial date and the schedule?

MR. GODFREY: Mr. Brock thinks February or March will be better. I don't think we will need a lot more time. Maybe about a month or so. So February or March. Mr. Brock says if it had to be January, we can do January.

THE COURT: Mr. Hilliard.

MR. HILLIARD: We were prepared to go in January before that case settled, Judge. So depending on their selection and who has that case and my participation versus the attorney's who might represent that client's participation, we were set to do that January trial. So it hasn't been that much of a delay. I would guess keep the trial setting and if there is an issue, we'll know it quickly as soon as selection is made and we'll inform the Court or get with each other and make suggestions depending on your trial setting. I am all about getting it tried sooner if we're ready and if the Court has dates for us. So my suggestion is keep it for now and hope we can try it at that time.

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THE COURT: So I indicated that I was inclined to go in GM's direction on this and I am going to largely because I think you guys have earned my trust and respect in how you are handling these things and in that regard I think new GM is in a better position to opine on what will be helpful to it in connection with its efforts to resolve all these cases through settlement or otherwise and therefore I am inclined to defer to new GM's view that if it doesn't have what it needs in those category C cases and other Bellwether cases it will in fact be helpful.

I will grant new GM's application on that score and consistent with your request direct you to submit within seven days of today either an agreed upon proposed order with case selection, discovery, and other pretrial deadlines for additional category C cases, obviously in accordance with the procedures we have previously used. If there is disagreement, you can tell me what those are.

I would love to keep the current trial date as is. So if it is feasible to do that, great.

Hang on one second.

(Pause)

If only because of my desire to keep to a reasonable aggressive schedule, I would like to keep that January date. Having said that, I think it might be ambiguous and I would note two things. One is I think it is currently scheduled to

begin January 15th, which is a court holiday, namely, Martin Luther King Day. It should be changed to January 16th at a minimum. Beyond that if you in getting into the weeds of these matters and discussing the dates think that is overly ambitious, at the moment I could try the case beginning on March 5th and that may prove to be more realistic. So I do have an opening. Or I could fit it in at the beginning of March, March 5th, and you can therefore discuss with one another knowing that that is an option on my end. So I will hear from you within a week on that score.

Let's talk about settlement. In short order we will have a conference in camera. My plan is to have a court reporter present for that with the intension that the transcript will be sealed so that there is a record of it for all sorts of reasons. I am happy to elaborate in that session, but I think that makes sense. Having said that to the extent we do discuss these matters in open session publically, I would like to do so. One thing that I would like is in looking back at GM's letter from February, I think it would make sense as I am pondering the future of the MDL and trying to decide where to push and when remands would be appropriate and what have you, I think it would be very helpful to get a regular update of the sort that is provided in that letter. Maybe a monthly inventory letter going through the categories as that letter did would be extremely helpful. It is at Docket 3726 if you

want to find it easily. I assume you know what I am talking about. It could be combined with the now monthly related case update or submitted as a separate letter. Whatever you guys think is sensible. One way or another I think it will be very helpful to me and all of us in efforts to get this across some sort of finish line to have a regular update on that front.

Beyond that, if Ms. Bloom is the one to speak to this or, Mr. Godfrey, if you would like to give me what you can.

MR. GODFREY: With respect to the settlement topic, it will be Ms. Bloom.

MS. BLOOM: I could do some of that now I think if helpful. We can put it in a letter as well.

I can report that as of now new GM has settled claims of 1,697 of the MDL 2543 claimants. There are about 230 additional since the February 24 submission. Of those 1,697 plaintiffs, there are 1,407 of them who are now dismissed. We expect another 75 of those claimants to have dismissals within the next several months. And then the others will take time as the settlement process works its way through.

We have then by our count about 1,090 unsettled post-bankruptcy plaintiffs remaining. As Mr. Godfrey noted, the largest category of those are the 226 by our count, which would be phase 2, category C claims. We are continuing to focus our attention in the post-sale order world. We are waiting for the Court's guidance with respect to presale order

on successor liability and also late claim rulings by the bankruptcy court. With respect to post-sale order claims, there are still remaining some law firms that we are working with who have some sizable dockets. And when your Honor is thinking about from your perspective breaking up cases by phase 1 or phase 2, we attempt to deal with a law firm to try to resolve their entire docket and they oftentimes will have cases that are phase 1 and phase 2 combined. So we're still in that kind of world.

We also have made very good progress now with respect to single-plaintiff claims in terms of having collected now and synthesized much of the materials that the plaintiffs have been ordered to provide as a result of the Court's order. So we are now actively engaging as well with law firms that have single-plaintiff cases. So that is a more time-consuming process, and at the moment we have not focused for example on placing discussions with phase 1 plaintiffs ahead of, say, plaintiffs with phase 2 claims. We more focused on a first-in-with-your-materials approach. So as plaintiffs have provided the materials, we are able to synthesize them that is really the order in which single-plaintiff cases we have been analyzing them at present. So that is in general terms where we are with respect to settlement.

THE COURT: Anything else to discuss in this setting on that front?

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Before we break and convene in the robing room for settlement issues, I am also prepared and will be addressing what has been referred to on the docket as the individual B issue in that setting.

We need to discuss future status conferences. Any thoughts on that? I would think in light of my rulings on Friday and the issues that you will be discussing in the next few weeks that we should presumably schedule a conference not long thereafter so that we can decide how to proceed on that front

MR. HILLIARD: We floated the date of September 1st for the next one, Judge. I believe that all parties were available if that works for you.

THE COURT: I don't think that works for me.

MR. HILLIARD: Or that area of that week. Late August, early September.

THE COURT: I thought as I already indicated I am out of the country until the 27th. I don't yet know which days of that week I will be in but wasn't prepared to be here every day that week. I will put it that way.

Mr. Godfrey.

MR. GODFREY: Two things: First, the Orange County trial will still be going on.

THE COURT: Excuse me?

MR. GODFREY: The Orange County trial may still be

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Mr. Berman thinks no. I think yes. It is not a two-week trial. I think it is more like four or five weeks. The judge only sits four days. On other days she hears other She has a busy docket. The Judge has a busy docket and only sits four days. I don't think we'll be done by then. If the trial were to be done by then, my wife arranged for us to go to Japan on vacation. If we do that, it is fine if Mr. Brock or Ms. Broom will cover in my absence. I thought the last week of August because someone else will cover in my absence or Mr. Berman's absence or third week of September. That week of September is fine. It shouldn't be dependent upon my schedule. Whatever works for the Court that is a logical time, but the Court ought to know that, A, I might not be here because we are done with that trial and I may be in Japan and, B, I am scheduled to be in Japan but may be in Orange County with Mr. Berman.

THE COURT: I am pleased to hear that you do sometimes vacation, Mr. Godfrey.

MR. GODFREY: This was an involuntary drafting, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me float the following question that may or may not be welcome given the Orange County trial, but would it not make sense to reconvene in the beginning of August on the theory that you will be submitting your thoughts in the next three weeks, and at a minimum we can discuss those issues

at a status conference at the beginning of August? 1 2 MR. GODFREY: That will work for us, your Honor, if 3 the Court thought that was helpful. MR. HILLIARD: In thinking about it realtime, it makes 4 5 sense for a couple reasons, Judge. By then there will be 6 clarity on the Guc issue and there will be information to 7 provide you in regards to the successor liability. So, yes, it would probably be helpful to do the first part of August. 8 9 MS. CABRASER: Your Honor, it is time for a real slow 10 talker. 11 THE COURT: Into the microphone even if it is slow. 12 MS. CABRASER: And loudly. 13 How about August 10th, your Honor? I think that works 14 for the co-leads. THE COURT: That would fork for me. 15 16 MS. CABRASER: That is a Thursday. 17 MR. GODFREY: That is the final pretrial for Mr. 18 Berman and myself in Orange County. THE COURT: Hopefully Mr. Berman knew that, too. 19 20 Would earlier that week be an option? 21 MS. CABRASER: Yes, your Honor, for plaintiffs. 22 THE COURT: I think I can do any day that week. 23 MR. GODFREY: I prefer not the 9th. 24 THE COURT: Is the 9th viable for you? 25 MR. GODFREY: Not the 9th.

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THE COURT: I thought you said on the 9th. 1 2 MR. GODFREY: No, because I have to go back to 3 California. MR. BERMAN: How about the 8th? 4 5 MR. GODFREY: The 8th works for me. 6 THE COURT: We'll reconvene on August 8th at the usual 7 time, 9:30, and go from there. I don't think we need to set future conference dates 8 9 now. We can discuss it on August 8th because what we do on 10 August 8th will have some bearing on that, not to mention by 11 then I will have resolved the schedule for the replacement 12 category C cases. 13 Anything else to discuss in this setting? If not, I 14 will expect the proposed order memorializing all that we have 15 done in the usual time. 16 Let's take a five-minute break so everybody can 17 stretch their legs or use the facilities and my deputy will let 18 you into the robing room and again we'll be on the record but that session will be under seal and we'll talk about various 19 20 issues there. 21 Thank you. 22 000

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