Ha41qmc 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 IN RE: GENERAL MOTORS LLC IGNITION SWITCH LITIGATION, 14 MD 2543 (JMF) 4 5 Conference New York, N.Y. 6 October 4, 2017 7 9:31 a.m. 8 Before: 9 HON. JESSE M. FURMAN, 10 District Judge 11 **APPEARANCES** LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN AND BERNSTEIN LLP 12 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 13 BY: ELIZABETH J. CABRASER, ESQ. 14 HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs 15 BY: STEVE W. BERMAN, ESQ. 16 HILLIARD MUNOZ GONZALES LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs 17 BY: ROBERT C. HILLIARD, ESQ. 18 BROWN RUDNICK LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs BY: EDWARD S. WEISFELNER, ESQ. 19 20 SUSMAN GODFREY LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs 21 BY: STEVEN M. SHEPARD, ESQ. 22 KIRKLAND & ELLIS, LLP Attorneys for Defendant 23 BY: MIKE BROCK, ESQ. RENEE D. SMITH, ESQ. 24 RICHARD C. GODFREY, ESQ. ANDREW B. BLOOMER, ESQ. 25 WENDY L. BLOOM, ESQ.

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1	THE COURT: Good morning. Welcome back, ladies and
2	gentlemen. Please state your appearances for the record.
3	MS. CABRASER: Good morning, your Honor. Elizabeth
4	Cabraser for plaintiffs.
5	MR. BERMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Steve Berman.
6	MR. WEISFELNER: Judge, Edward Weisfelner, Brown
7	Rudnick.
8	MR. HILLIARD: Good morning, Judge. Bob Hilliard.
9	MR. GODFREY: Good morning, your Honor. For New GM,
10	Rick Godfrey, joined by Mr. Brock, Ms. Smith, Mr. Bloomer, and,
11	at your Honor's request, Ms. Bloom.
12	THE COURT: Always happy to see Ms. Bloom. It
13	suggests progress is being made.
14	All right. And is Mr. Shepard here as well?
15	MR. SHEPARD: Yes, I am, your Honor.
16	THE COURT: All right. Welcome, Mr. Shepard. And
17	good morning to you.
18	All right. I think CourtCall is operational is my
19	understanding. We've been having some technical difficulties
20	in my courtroom the last couple days. I think they have been
21	resolved. We'll find out, I'm sure.
22	COURTCALL REPRESENTATIVE: Yes, your Honor, CourtCall
23	is connected and able to hear in the courtroom.
24	THE COURT: There you go. Excellent.

So just a reminder: Please speak into the microphone

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so that everyone here and on the call can hear you.

I did receive this morning an electronic device order from Mr. Shepard. I assume you did receive it back. I just want to tell everybody, don't assume that I'll be able to act on things if you send them at 8:00 the morning that you need them. So particularly as we approach trial, as you know, it is really up to you to ensure that your needs are met and to do that in advance of the trial to ensure that if there are any issues, they are resolved in a timely fashion. And I was able to sign that order and get it back this morning, but don't assume I'll be able to do that on such short notice at all times.

Before we proceed, I feel obliged to ask how everybody from Texas is doing. I was obviously thinking a lot of you in the days leading up to the hurricane and then the days after. I hope everybody down there is doing okay.

MR. HILLIARD: Thanks, Judge. So Houston is in trouble still. The counties surrounding Corpus Christi were devastated. I was telling some of my associates, they actually canceled their school district and sent the kids to Corpus, and they're still in a bad way. Corpus Christi was basically spared except for a loss of power after six or seven days. Friends in Houston are probably, as you can imagine, just having new lifestyle, and permanently so, unfortunately, but thank you very much for your thoughts.

THE COURT: All right. Well, to the extent that there are any needs on that front or, for that matter, if there are lawyers from Puerto Rico or Las Vegas or anywhere affected — it seems like we're surrounded by a lot of awful things these days — let me know, I'll be as accommodating as I can, but my thoughts are with the folks down there from the MDL and from other places as well. And I didn't mean to leave out Florida. The list goes on.

All right. You guys I think have all met at this point my new law clerk, Kristen Loveland, who will be the GM clerk, so to speak, for the next year or so. So I think her transition has largely been smooth, but give her a little bit of a break because as she learns the ropes, there's a lot to handle on our end, and you all know how things work better than she does at the moment. So to the extent that you can help her out and help ensure that the transition is smooth, that would be great.

Let's get to the agenda. First item on the agenda is the status of the bankruptcy proceedings. I would have put under this heading the representational issues that have been raised in the letters over the last few days, although you guys put that in the coordination and related actions item on the agenda, but I'll address it now. The long and short of it is, I'm not going to opine on that myself, for two reasons. One is, I am firmly of the view that it is not ripe at the moment.

I would note in that regard that in New GM's own letter, Quinn Emanuel letter of September 25th that was submitted to Judge Glenn, one of the arguments that New GM made to Judge Glenn with respect to how to proceed with respect to the issues before him was that addressing the enforcement of the settlement in the first instance would potentially obviate the need to get into and resolve all sorts of complicated issues, and among the list of issues that were flagged in that letter was the very representational issues that have been raised before me. All of which is to say I think, on New GM's own view, those issues are only relevant or ripe in the event that Judge Glenn decides that the settlement is enforceable, and for that reason, I do think that it would be an advisory opinion and/or is not ripe at this juncture.

On top of that, my inclination is to think -- and I don't even need to get into this, really, but I will nevertheless. My inclination is to think that these are not issues for me to decide, that they're for Judge Glenn to decide. I don't think, as I read plaintiff's counsel's papers, I don't read them to be suggesting -- and there may be errant lines here or there in the settlement papers or what have you. I don't read them to be suggesting that they are purporting to represent absent parties but rather proposing some sort of procedural mechanism via Rule 9019 by which notice can be provided and essentially bind absent parties. To me that's an

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issue for Judge Glenn to decide whether that's kosher and a proper way of proceeding or if Rule 23 is the necessary way of proceeding, and I think wrapped up in that is whether plaintiff's counsel have the authority to sort of do that. I understand the arguments, I think they're interesting issues, but at least my initial reaction is: (a) they're not ripe; and (b) to the extent that they would be ripe, they're not for me to decide in the first instance. But again, I come back to their not being ripe. If they ripen and there is a good-faith belief to think that I am the relevant judge to opine on these issues, then you can certainly come back to me. Judge Glenn and I did talk about the matter so it's on both of our radars, and we'll have future opportunities to talk about it if or when it becomes a relevant issue. So I don't think anything further needs to be discussed on that front.

Taking a step back, I don't know if you all will agree on the issue, but I wouldn't mind your help in understanding what the relationship is between those issues that are being litigated before Judge Glenn and the MDL writ large — that is to say, what bearing or what effect the settlement, if it turns out to be enforceable, would have on the claims in the MDL and the prospects for settlement in the MDL and the mediation in connection with that and so forth. And again, I don't know if you are all in agreement on this. I certainly have some notion or inkling of what I think the relationship is between these

things, but I confess there are a lot of moving parts and complications here, and I just want to get a better handle on whether my inkling is correct. So again, I don't know if you all agree, but anyone want to share their thoughts on --

MR. BERMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Steve Berman.

First, to update the Court, yesterday Judge Glenn set a trial date of December $18^{\rm th}$ through the $20^{\rm th}$ for our motion to enforce the settlement agreement. So that's just an update on the status of that. With respect to providing you a submission —

THE COURT: And Ms. Loveland was listening in on that conference. My understanding is that he did decide to bifurcate and deal with the enforcement question first, was that correct?

MR. BERMAN: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. BERMAN: With respect to the issue of providing you some kind of memo on where all this might be going, we'd be glad to do that.

THE COURT: To be clear, I didn't ask for a memo. I just asked for your thoughts. But if you think it's better to be done in writing, that's fine. I'm not interested in litigating the issue so much as just getting a sense of what the bigger picture is or at least what your respective views of the bigger picture are. If you think it's better to do that in

writing, that's fine. Although you certainly all give me plenty of things to read already. So what are your thoughts?

MR. BERMAN: Well, I think because of the complications of the overlapping issues, I would prefer to have time to think it through, consult with Ms. Cabraser, and give you something very short in writing.

THE COURT: All right. That's fine with me. And for what it's worth, based on my conversations with Judge Glenn, I imagine that he might appreciate a little bit of a sense of the bigger picture as well. So I think copying him or sending it to both of us might be in order, although I'm taking some liberties in speaking on his behalf.

All right. Mr. Godfrey, do you have any problem with that?

MR. GODFREY: No, your Honor. I think that there are, depending on how this proceeds before Judge Glenn, a number of issues that are not only overlapping but are issues that, up until now, this Court has had the principal responsibility for. For example, there was a suggestion yesterday during the hearing, and I have the transcript of it, that perhaps they will seek class certification. That is going to be an issue that I think is ripe for your Honor and is certainly overlapping. There is an issue about the notice which I think is ripe for your Honor. Your Honor has issued orders in the past with respect to notifying potential class members and

consumers. That's going to be an overlap issue. And then there's experts. Because the putative proof by which the aggregation of claims is made to justify the exercise of the shares under Section 3.2 of the sale agreement, 3.2(c) is based upon experts, that we think your Honor is going to have to determine whether those experts, A, are experts and, B, whether their so-called conjoint analysis meets the standards.

With respect to your Honor's initial observation, I understand the court's position. I don't think my silence should be seen as acquiescence, because let's make one thing perfectly clear. The draft agreement purports to represent the millions of --

THE COURT: I read your papers.

MR. GODFREY: I got it.

THE COURT: I got it. And I didn't take your silence as acquiescence. I took it as hearing that I have made my ruling.

All right. So I don't think there's any great rush in getting me something on the sort of big picture issues. And to be clear, I'm not looking to gin up issues for me to resolve or for you to litigate. I think this is really kind of a status report on what you think this all means and how you think it all fits together and depending on sort of what happens in that litigation, what you see happening here, just so I have a slightly better sense of the big picture.

So do you want to say letters up to five pages, two weeks from today? Does that seem reasonable?

MR. BERMAN: Seems reasonable to us.

MR. GODFREY: I'm not sure, your Honor, because there was a -- we will file the transcript of yesterday's hearing with the Court. I think you will see a shifting explanation of what they're trying to achieve with the bankruptcy court, and until we know precisely what it is their plan in the bankruptcy court is -- are they going to seek class certification, and if so, when. I can identify issues based upon yesterday's transcript, but I think it's a little unfair for your Honor for us to identify issues if that's not going to be their plan or if they're going to change. I think we need to have a very clear understanding of what it is they propose in the bankruptcy court, and Judge Glenn asked those questions yesterday and he got answers, but I don't think that discussion is yet done.

THE COURT: I understand that, and to the extent there are open issues or questions, perhaps you'll just have to say these are the various possibilities and the way things could go, but I think giving me a sense of the big picture is a good idea and should be feasible even if you don't entirely know how things are going to proceed and can't tell the future. So —

MR. GODFREY: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: Letters not to exceed five pages. If that

application, but within two weeks. And again, I'm not looking for you to raise issues for me to resolve. I have enough on my plate from you and others. But really, this is just sort of a status report, step back and tell me what's going on and, you know, both with respect to what impact it has on the claims and motion practice here and also on the prospect for settlement here.

All right. Anything else to discuss on items 1 through 4, that is, bankruptcy coordination and related actions, document production, and deposition update?

MR. GODFREY: Just as an update, we start the Orange County trial on October the 23rd, your Honor. I thought the Court ought to be aware of that. I don't see any issues at the moment of the type of the emerging risk we've identified before, but because that court will be hearing some of the issues that would have been before this Court, there's always that possibility, and I thought the Court should be aware of that.

THE COURT: How long is that trial slated to go?

MR. GODFREY: Mr. Berman and I may disagree on that.

I think with the evidence they want to put in, we'll be done around Thanksgiving. He seemed to think it would be done in two weeks. He sits four days a week. So I think it's at least 16 to 20 trial days, but Mr. Berman may have a different view.

THE COURT: Well, I'll be seeing some of you quite a bit during that period anyway, so you'll know how to find me if anything comes up.

Anything else on those items?

All right. That brings us then to status of the Scruggs trial, which I'll now call Scruggs rather than Dodson. If you detected a degree of frustration in my text order of yesterday and then my subsequent opinion addressing the motions in limine and the OSI evidence, that is because I am a little bit frustrated. We've been at this for three plus years, and I have a tremendous amount of respect for all of you and the work that you've done and do, but, you know, the procedures that we have set up that heretofore have worked pretty well, in my opinion, are really designed to tee up disputes early and to get them resolved in a timely fashion, and the theory is, the closer we get to trial, the fewer new issues that will arise, and to some extent it feels a little bit like the opposite is happening here — the closer we get to trial, the more new things are popping up.

On top of that, as I indicated yesterday, it is my view that you could have done, and going forward I hope will do a much better job of, number one, conferring in advance of filing any motions to ensure that issues are actually in dispute. There were at least two motions in limine that I

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think either there wasn't a real dispute or the real dispute was significantly narrower than the opening brief might have suggested, and I had admonished you at the August conference to confer in advance of those motions to ensure that that didn't happen, and I don't feel like that succeeded to the degree I would have liked. Number two, as my ruling on the OSI evidence I think made clear, I think that there are rulings that I have made in the past that I understand the advocates' desire to argue your case to kingdom come, but I'm just don't want to entertain reargument unless you think that there is a demonstrable and material legal error that I have made or something distinguishable about this case. And you can preserve your rights in whatever way you think is appropriate, as you have done in other instances, but I really do expect that you will heed my past rulings and apply them in good faith to the case going forward and therefore minimize the amount of briefing that you need to submit and the amount of issues that I need to decide. And be mindful of the fact that there's only one of me and there are a lot of you. And I know there are others of you who are not even sitting here.

So please hear me. I have a lot on my plate at the moment. I have a lot on my plate just with respect to this trial, but I'm out two days this week, three days next week for Jewish holidays, I have the MDL conference coming up, I have a bench trial before this trial starts, I have all the motions

for this trial, I have all the motions in the MDL generally, and I have 300 other cases with a lot of motions, so hear me when I say that I need your help to really try to limit the amount of things that you need from me, and the easier you make my job, the happier I will be and the happier you will be by extension. So I don't need you to respond. I'm certainly not interested in figuring out, you know, which side is more to blame, if that's even an appropriate way to think about it. I just am making a desperate plea.

All right. So in particular, with the things coming down the pike and the Scruggs deadline chart, I think there's the Valukas and statement of facts briefing that I gave you an extension on until Friday; there's the show cause briefing with respect to past evidentiary rulings; there's obviously the deposition designation disputes. You know, really thinking hard about, are these depositions that we actually are going to play at this trial, is this evidence that we are actually going to offer at trial, you know, and not briefing things that are really hypothetical rather than real, and again, faithfully applying my past rulings would make me very grateful.

All right. There are two issues that are fully briefed on this front that are flagged in the agenda letter. Well, there are more issues that are fully briefed that are on my plate at the moment, and I hope to rule on *Daubert* and summary judgment in particular in the next week or two.

First, with respect to the trial subpoena dispute,		
I've read your briefs. I confess that I have not had a chance		
yet to read the cases or really think too much about the issue,		
and on that score, I'm going to reserve judgment. I did want		
to take the opportunity, since I have you here, just to ask New		
GM to address one issue or argument on the interaction between		
Rule 43 and Rule 45. Namely, there is a line in the advisory		
committee notes on Rule 45 that states and I think this is		
flagged in one of plaintiff's briefs that when an order		
under Rule 43(a) authorizes testimony from a remote location,		
the witness can be commanded to testify from any place		
described in Rule $45(c)(1)$, which strikes me as a pretty strong		
basis to conclude that there is an interaction between the		
rules, a synergy between the rules, and that Rule 43 should be		
read in such a way that the place for compliance, if you will,		
is more critical than the place of the actual physical trial.		
But do you care to respond?		

MR. HILLIARD: Your Honor, since Mr. Shepard is going to be my co-counsel in this trial, with your permission -- I think the bankruptcy issues were prepared to be addressed -- can we play musical chairs and bring Mr. Shepard to counsel table?

THE COURT: You can. Sorry, Mr. Weisfelner, if I didn't give you a chance to shine today, but --

MR. WEISFELNER: Thank you, Judge.

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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Shepard?

All right. Everybody's in place? Go ahead.

MS. SMITH: Good morning, your Honor. Renee Smith. We have looked at that issue and kind of had the same reaction that the Court had and looked for cases to see if they addressed this precise advisory committee note, and we couldn't find any. So we're left looking at, when an order under Rule 43(a) authorizes testimony from a remote location, the witness can be commanded to testify from any place described in Rule 45(c)(1). Then you go to Rule 45(c)(1), it says place of compliance, for trial, hearing, or deposition, etc., within a hundred miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person. So when it says that they can be commanded from any place described in Rule 45(c)(1), I do agree there's obviously synergy contemplated there, but the synergy is perhaps the person is not live in the courthouse, but when you are commanding somebody to come, it still needs to be within 100 miles of the place of compliance, which in this case the place of compliance is the trial and the trial is in New York. And I know we have a lot of discussion in both our briefs on the MTBE decision, which was decided under the old Rule 45, but the crux of that opinion is, the trial is where the trial is. The place of

THE COURT: Although it didn't -- and I already said I

compliance is here in New York City.

haven't read the cases so I haven't read Judge Scheindlin's opinion, but my impression is that the old rule was framed in terms of where a subpoena could be served, that it couldn't be served beyond a hundred miles from the courthouse where the trial was taking place. So, I mean, that strikes me as a more fundamental and threshold problem. That problem is no longer in the rule because service can be nationwide. So now we're talking about the place of compliance. I mean, I guess, again, having not read the cases, I'm hesitant to opine, but it strikes me that it may or may not have shed a lot of light on what the current rules and their interaction and interplay should be.

MS. SMITH: Yes. And Rule 45, as we all know, was overhauled extensively, so there's a lot of apples and oranges here. But the place of compliance, from the MTBE court, the basic -- my reading of her opinion is that you just don't artificially -- you cannot use Rule 43 to artificially change the place of compliance, the place of trial, and under Rule 45(c)(1), even if there's synergy between Rule 43(a) and Rule 45(c)(1), which I agree there is, that still has to be within a hundred miles of where the trial is, and the trial is in New York.

THE COURT: And there's an argument in your briefs, if I remember correctly, that the subpoenas served here are facially improper. Is that because they command appearance at

trial but then there's a rider, if you will, that says you don't actually have to appear at trial? What's the facial --

MS. SMITH: That's correct. On their face, the subpoenas actually direct, command the witnesses to come to trial at this courthouse in New York, and then there's a rider that says, we don't really mean that, we really mean at a place convenient to the witness.

THE COURT: Okay. I mean, how is that different than a subpoena that -- certainly in the grand jury context, you often see that says, you're commanded to appear, but if you provide these records in advance of your appearance date, then you don't have to appear.

MS. SMITH: Right. I think the point is just that as they are written now, it's invalid, and maybe they could be revised if the Court found that was appropriate. But as it's written now, it says you need to come to the courthouse in New York.

THE COURT: Okay. And if I remember correctly, there was one of the six subpoenas that had not yet been served. Is that still the case?

MS. SMITH: I actually am not sure. Mr. Shepard, do you know if it's actually been served yet?

THE COURT: Mr. Shepard, you're not accustomed to appearing here yet, but make sure you speak into the microphone and make sure to remember that for all time. Go ahead.

MR. SHEPARD: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

The subpoena to Mr. Mercer has not yet been served. We expect to do so in October. Deposition has been scheduled in Detroit for October 13th. If it hasn't been served by then, it will be on that day.

THE COURT: I was about to say that seems like a good moment to serve it. All right. Very good.

Anything else you want to say, Ms. Smith?

MS. SMITH: I know you're just reading the papers, but regardless of the 45/43 interaction, there is just no compelling circumstance under Rule 43 here.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Shepard, I don't want to deprive you of an opportunity to be heard on this. I am not going to decide it today. I think there's some interesting issues here and I want to think more about them and read the cases, but anything you want to say just in response to what Ms. Smith has said?

MR. SHEPARD: Very briefly, your Honor. The place of compliance would be the bankruptcy court in the Eastern

District of Michigan. We confirmed with them that the IT systems will work with this courtroom here.

THE COURT: All right. And don't read anything into this, and I mean that. Are things in place such that if I granted the application in whole or in part, you'd be prepared to proceed, technologically, that is?

MR. SHEPARD: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good.

All right. So I'll give you my ruling on that as soon as I can. Obviously you should proceed with respect to the two depositions in the coming weeks, and you should be prepared for the possibility that I won't allow live transmission and therefore that those depositions will have to function as the trial testimony of those two witnesses, but all of which is to say that everybody should hedge their bets, I guess, and I'll give you my ruling as quickly as I can.

All right. The other issue is the Rule 37.2 motion, if you will. I do want to note that letters on 37.2 issues are not to exceed three pages, but I let it slide this time. The first issue regarding OSI seems to be moot or withdrawn based on the exchange of letters, so I have nothing further to say on that. On the other issue with respect to Keepers and Lo, I think what I'm going to do is address that and resolve it in the context of my Daubert ruling since there's sort of an interplay and interaction with the arguments under Daubert.

I guess I did want to just pose a question to New GM based on the letter that it submitted last night. And I granted leave to file. There's an argument in there -- let me see if I can find it.

So the argument is made that plaintiff should be precluded from offering the general causation opinion. I think

those are arguments that are fully joined in the Daubert briefing that, again, I'll get to when I resolve that motion, hopefully in the next week or so. But then the second issue is with respect to the suggestion in plaintiff's letter, which is now I think ripe in light of my motion in limine ruling, that she should be permitted to offer the specific causation opinions by way of rebuttal but rebuttal should be permitted to go first, you know, in anticipation of New GM's evidence. New GM argues that I should find that the plaintiff has waived the specific causation opinions.

And to me, there are two different issues. One is this argument that she has waived them, and I guess I wanted to find out what the basis of that would be. If the basis is the stipulation that Ms. Scruggs filed back in August, on its face, at least, the stipulation is limited to the evidence to be presented at trial in her case in chief. So I don't know how I could find a waiver if on its face the disclaimer of an intent to proceed with that evidence or make those arguments is limited to the case in chief, although maybe there is an argument to be made.

The second question is just the procedural/merits question as to, putting aside waiver, whether it's proper to proceed in the way that Ms. Scruggs is proposing. It strikes me as creative, I will say, but maybe it passes muster. I don't know.

So Ms. Smith, do you want to take this on as well?

MS. SMITH: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

So in this issue we raised a *Daubert* challenge to Dr. Keepers and Dr. Lo because they did not consider the October -- or even know about the October 2015 accident. We raised it in our *Daubert* brief. We said it's unreliable, doesn't meet *Daubert*. Plaintiff in reply said -- not only do they say they're withdrawing those opinions, but plaintiff offered no response to our *Daubert* challenge. So they didn't respond to our *Daubert* challenge, and it's too late to do so now. They never did. And so that's the basis of our waiver point is they didn't address the -- regardless of how the Court ruled on the motions in *limine*, regardless of the case in chief argument, they've never responded to our argument that these experts' opinions are inadmissible under *Daubert*.

THE COURT: I see. Okay. I did not appreciate or understand that from the letter.

All right. Anything else you want to say on that?

MS. SMITH: And then I don't know if you wanted to
address the second point, which was the case in chief issue.

THE COURT: Yes. So assume for the sake of argument that I don't buy that argument and I think that they haven't waived their right to rely on it or what have you or give them an opportunity to be heard about the *Daubert* arguments that you made, what have you. Assume we get past that. And I'm not

suggesting that I will, but assume that I do. What do you say to their proposal that they can do this on rebuttal but in anticipation of your evidence?

MS. SMITH: Right. Basically it's their burden of proof. In their case in chief they have to present admissible expert evidence on their causation theories, and they wouldn't be able to wait until we're done and then bring it in rebuttal. This is basically just saying, we said we wouldn't bring this evidence in our case in chief, but really we're going to bring this evidence in our case in chief. I don't -- I'm kind of at a loss to understand what it is they are proposing to do.

THE COURT: I think they're proposing that they disclaimed an intent to bring it in their case in chief but not in rebuttal, so they want to be allowed to do it in rebuttal and they want to be allowed to do it before your case, on the theory that it's just a more efficient way to proceed.

Now there are three options, I think, that I can think of. One is that that's okay. Again, putting aside the waiver issues that you've already argued. Two is, that's not okay and they should be permitted to call them by way of rebuttal but only after you've presented your case and therefore made any motions that you want to make at the close of their case without, obviously, that evidence being part of the record.

Number three is that they're not permitted to do it at all, I guess.

MS. SMITH: We'll go with option number three, which I think is a hybrid of one and two, which is they can't hold something that's something they know about in their case in chief and hold it for rebuttal. I just don't understand how that would work. So our option three is, they cannot do it in their case in chief and they cannot do it in rebuttal.

THE COURT: Do you have law to support that? Listen, in every other trial there hasn't been a rebuttal case.

MS. SMITH: Exactly.

THE COURT: My approach in a civil case is that the parties basically know what issues are likely to be raised. That's the point of discovery, that's the point of depositions, that's the point of the entire process, really, such that you can anticipate and address in your case in chief things that would otherwise quote-unquote be rebuttal. So, you know, really, unless something is truly unanticipated and comes out of left field on the defense case -- I mean, I guess in five and a half years I have never had a rebuttal case in a civil trial, but I don't know if I would be on firm ground in precluding a rebuttal case in these circumstances. I've never been presented with this kind of situation.

MS. SMITH: Yes. We are happy to get you case law on this, but it's my understanding you cannot hold back something on rebuttal that you reasonably could have anticipated to come in on your case in chief.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Shepard?

MR. SHEPARD: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Microphone. You forgot very quickly.

MR. SHEPARD: Thank you, your Honor.

On point one, the Daubert challenge from GM was directed at the following issue: What was the cause, which accident was the cause of the injuries that are shown on the April 2017 MRI. Now New GM did not challenge these experts' ability to look at the MRI and to distinguish between injuries that looked to be the result of an automobile accident and chronic degenerative cervical disease. That was not challenged. What New GM did point out, and fairly so, is that there were two different accidents and our experts had not disclosed in their report and had not opined as to any ability to say that the injuries caused by an accident were our accident from 2013 or a later accident in 2015.

THE COURT: Because your client didn't tell them about it.

MR. SHEPARD: New GM's point was well taken, your Honor. The ability to look at a 2017 MRI and say that the accident is from 2013 or 2015, it's not there. And we can't do it. However, what New GM never challenged, and what we therefore didn't need to respond to in our *Daubert* response, was the ability of these experts to say, I can tell the difference between an automobile accident and chronic

degenerative cervical disease. And what New GM's experts are going to say when they testify is: There's no accident injury here at all; I look at the 2017 MRI and all I see is chronic degenerative cervical disease. In fairness, your Honor, we need the ability to rebut that and say, incorrect, the 2017 MRI also shows accident injury. And GM is free to point out -- and I don't think there will be any dispute about this -- that there's no way to tell which accident caused that. But it is not the case, as New GM's expert will say, that the only thing you see in that MRI is chronic degenerative disease.

THE COURT: All right. So to be clear, if they're permitted to testify, they would not be opining that the accident caused injury attributable to the 2013 accident as opposed to the 2015 accident, correct?

MR. SHEPARD: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And given that, tell me how this would be helpful to the fact finder. That is to say, to the extent that the fact finder's task is to decide what if any injury is attributable to the 2013 accident, if the experts can't actually opine on that, how is that ultimately helpful?

MR. SHEPARD: It's helpful, your Honor, because the jury will hear from New GM that there's no accident injury at all. New GM's position will be, the only problems with her back are from chronic degenerative disease, and I know that because I've looked at the 2017 MRI. So the fact finder,

hearing that, will think, well, then clearly she wasn't injured by this accident or any other accident, 2013 or 2015. In fairness, we need an ability to rebut that and say, although we can't tell you for certainty whether it was the 2015 or 2013, jurors, there is accident injury here. So it is not the case, as New GM is trying to tell you, that a scan of her back in 2017 shows no accident injury at all.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. I think I at least get it.

I guess the question I have for each of you is, or the question I have for myself, is whether it's worth having you brief this sort of procedural question about anticipatory rebuttal versus rebuttal now or does it make sense to wait until I've ruled on the more fundamental issues. It may not become a relevant issue if I decide that the experts can't testify at all for one reason or another. But at the same time -- well, any thoughts on that?

MR. SHEPARD: Your Honor, this is the broad discretion of the Court as to how best to structure the case for the jury. We're okay with putting on a rebuttal case after New GM is done. We suggest this because it's in keeping with the Court's prior procedures and it's the more efficient, condensed way to get the two sides to the jury. Further, your Honor, I'll say, we're not intending to use --

THE COURT: But I think the question and the argument that Ms. Smith is making, or would be making, is that to the

extent that you can anticipate evidence or argument in the defense case that it's your obligation to present that as part of your case in chief and not essentially sort of wait, lie in wait or sandbag them by doing it on rebuttal and that in essence — to use a phrase from the opinion I filed yesterday — this is a little too cute by half to say we're waiving our right to do this in our case in chief and we're going to try to do it by rebuttal, and by the way, we want to do our rebuttal as part of our case in chief.

MR. SHEPARD: Your Honor, we're happy to wait, as a procedural matter, to do the rebuttal. We suggest that is the most efficient way to present this to the jury.

THE COURT: No, I get that, but the question is -- well, all right.

Ms. Smith, do you have any thoughts on when or if to have briefing on the procedural issue?

MS. SMITH: I know your Honor would like nothing more than more briefing in this case, but may I suggest that I believe, when you consider the *Daubert* issues, what will become clear is, they've withdrawn the specific causation opinions. There's nothing left there. This new opinion about generally could have possibly been caused by an accident is neither disclosed nor is it helpful to the jury, nor does it pass other muster under *Daubert* or Rule 702, so I don't think the Court will need to reach this issue, so may I propose that we hold

off doing additional briefing, if that's acceptable to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. I think I will proceed that way. Again, you shouldn't read into that any views on the merits because I haven't resolved them, but I'm hoping to get you a decision on Daubert in the next week or so, as I indicated, and that would leave adequate time to brief this issue if it is relevant, and I don't need to make you write more briefs, let alone receive more briefs, as I've already indicated. So we'll do that.

MR. SHEPARD: May I be heard very briefly, your Honor?
THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SHEPARD: The specific causation opinion that was withdrawn in our *Daubert* response brief is not a withdrawal of these experts' ability to opine as to what the 2017 MRI says about the difference between a chronic degenerative disease injury and an accident-caused injury, all right? The *Daubert* response is a response to a specific argument made by GM, which is a strong argument, which is, these experts can't tell the difference between 2015 and 2013. And what our response was intended to convey to New GM and the Court is, that's right, they're not going to. That's all we meant to say.

THE COURT: All right. Understood. I'll read the briefs and decide for myself. I just revealed that I haven't read the briefs yet.

Anything else on Scruggs that we need to deal with now?

MR. BROCK: I was just going to raise the issue as to whether or not the Court had given any thought to time allocations for the case.

THE COURT: To what allocations?

MR. BROCK: Time allocations per party.

THE COURT: It's sort of hard for me to do that in advance of the joint pretrial order, which hasn't been filed.

MR. BROCK: That's fine. We can take that up later. We had talked about it at the end of the last trial just briefly, and we can talk about it a little bit and be prepared at the pretrial. That will be fine.

THE COURT: Why don't you add to the pretrial order, if you have views on how much time you think you should be allocated and whether it should be evenly divided, etc., you can opine. I'm cautioning you that, as I said in the last trial, that I think the earlier trials were a bit overtried, and my intention is to ensure that that doesn't happen. I think the last one went pretty well and quickly, and I'd like to replicate that. So be mindful of that and don't be greedy with what you're asking for.

MR. BROCK: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Good.

Next item on the agenda is the Baker Garcia issue, and

I confess I don't really understand what that issue is or I'm a little bit at a loss. I would think either it does qualify or it doesn't qualify, and why is there uncertainty about that, why does it need to be briefed, why is this issue arising, and, if it doesn't qualify, what happens then?

Anyone? Bueller? Bueller?

MR. GODFREY: We're canvassing, your Honor.

MR. BLOOMER: Your Honor, Ferris Bueller. No, Andrew Bloomer on behalf of New GM. I think we share the Court's views as to why it would be briefed. The plaintiffs have raised this issue with us in a meet-and-confer --

THE COURT: Who represents the plaintiffs in Baker Garcia?

MR. BLOOMER: I think it's the Bailey firm.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BLOOMER: And so we were surprised, just given the fact that discovery is ongoing, the selection was made sometime ago. We don't agree with the plaintiff's position on it. I participated in a meet-and-confer last week on the issue, and the plaintiffs have taken the position that they want to raise this issue with the Court. We're happy to respond to that. I think we proposed — they were planning I think to file, subject to the Court's agreement, their letter motion on this today and then we were going to respond early next week. We've only arrived at that juncture because the parties have a

dispute as to whether that case is properly within the category it's in. We don't think there is a valid basis to the plaintiff's position and tried to convince them of that, but without success, and they seem determined to want to file something on it.

THE COURT: All right. Well, since they're not here,

I don't have much --

MR. HILLIARD: I can speak generally, Judge, as we've been monitoring that on the MDL side, based on my appointment in it. It seems the issue, according to the Bailey firm, is that it doesn't qualify as a Category C because they actually got the repair done to the ignition switch prior to the accident and there's no issue that the replaced ignition switch, the repaired ignition switch, was defective, so the Bailey firm is advising GM this isn't a vehicle that's subject to the definition of Order 107. Again, I'm just reading the concerns that the plaintiff's attorneys have about whether or not proceeding with the effort necessary to try the case should go to this specific file, given that the client got the ignition switch repaired and it's not subject to recall.

THE COURT: So I don't understand what the claim is if the repair was made in advance of the accident and there's no claim that the replacement switch was defective.

MR. HILLIARD: One of the dangers of offering -THE COURT: Seems like a more fundamental problem than

whether it fits in Category C.

MR. HILLIARD: One of the dangers, Judge, of offering this information to you semiblind and reading it from here is that I would anticipate you would either ask that or even a more fundamental question. I would suggest and perhaps hope that you would allow this to be dug into a little bit and let me try to either offer some explanation through a filing or get to the bottom of it with the lawyer who is representing these plaintiffs again. We're monitoring the issue and participated in the meet-and-confer with Mr. Bloomer, but we are not primarily responsible. But I hear what your concern is. I know that you want this answer. I don't have it right now. I may get it before the end of this hearing today, but I simply don't know.

THE COURT: Okay. I mean, I think you ought to get to the bottom of this because, again, based on what you just said -- and I recognize that you're not representing them and there are some dangers in opining, therefore, but --

MR. HILLIARD: I'm not passing it off on somebody else. I will get to the bottom of it, report back to the Court, and deal directly with GM on this issue. With a short reprieve.

THE COURT: Okay. I mean, if what you said is the case, then I again think there's a more fundamental issue, and I think the remedy is not withdrawing it from Category C or the

bellwether program, it's withdrawing it altogether, and I'm looking back at the initial complaint and what allegations are made in the complaint. There may be many fundamental problems on that front as well. But seems like you all need to think about this and discuss it.

MR. HILLIARD: And I read between the lines of what you just said, Judge, and I share that concern too. I will find out as soon as this hearing is over.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BLOOMER: Your Honor, I just have one thing. The fundamental issue you raised was addressed on our meet-and-confer. I did ask, and so our position is, if they want to dismiss the case, that's their decision. But there are cases like this. It's a representative case. I did ask plaintiff's counsel during the meet-and-confer, in your case are you challenging the adequacy of the recall remedy, and the answer was yes. Obviously that's been an issue in other cases that the Court has had as part of its bellwether procedures.

THE COURT: I don't think I've had a case where the accident occurred after the recall was announced, so the issue has always been whether that evidence is admissible because the recall postdated the accident. It sounds like this is a different scenario.

MR. BLOOMER: It may be, but if the challenge -- if it's part of their case and their claims against my client that

the recall remedy was ineffective and somehow had some involvement in this action, in this accident, then we can address this in briefing, but I think that firmly fits into the category which doesn't otherwise limit it.

THE COURT: All right. Well, the Bailey firm is not here. I don't want to get too far out in front of this issue. But needless to say, I do think we need to get to the bottom of it and make sure that we're not wasting our time in one way or another on it.

So sounds like they intend to file something by the end of the day and New GM proposed to respond by Monday, which is fine with me. It is a holiday, but I'll be working, so if you all want to file it on the holiday, that's fine by me.

Anything else to discuss there?

MR. BLOOMER: No. Probably makes sense to get it resolved sooner rather than later, your Honor. We're happy to file on Monday.

THE COURT: I would think so. And assuming that this is withdrawn, either because it's dismissed or just withdrawn from the bellwether program, if you will, what does that mean? I guess that leaves us with just the one Gray case, is that correct?

MR. BLOOMER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

Next item is --

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MR. BROCK: Your Honor, I just want to mention, I don't think just withdrawing the case from the bellwether case is an option. I think the plaintiff's options are a dismissal or they can come to you for relief, but I don't think, after a case is selected and discovery is under way, that they have the option of just saying, we decide not to proceed with this case. It's either they would dismiss the case or they would come to you for the relief that we've been talking about.

THE COURT: Well, I'll reserve judgment on that. think it is a valid question. Thinking back, and I'd have to look at the bellwether orders, you know, the bellwether was presumed, in essence, that you all agreed on what cases fit within what category, defined those categories, but I don't think there was a process to adjudicate as a threshold matter which cases were in which categories. That being said, GM made its selection on July 24th, Docket No. 4318, so I think to the extent that the point is that if counsel in that case believed that it was not actually properly in Category C, then they really should have spoken up at some point between July 24th and today, and it's slightly problematic that they didn't immediately say, hey, wait a second, we're not actually a Category C case. So in any event, I'll leave it there for now. I'll look for the briefs, and then we'll take it up at that point.

MR. BROCK: I just want to mention one other thing.

I'll look at this as soon as we finish here.

I do think, like for some of the other selections, there is an option to strike a case before expert testimony is undertaken, so I think that date comes along in November, if I recall, but I'll need to look at the order again on that.

THE COURT: Give me one second on that.

December 1.

MR. BROCK: December 1? Okay.

THE COURT: So that's certainly an option as well.

All right. I'll look for those briefs.

That brings us to next steps for personal injury/wrongful death cases. I am well aware of the pending and long-pending summary judgment motion on the Category B cases. I don't quarrel with your reminding me of it, but suffice it so say you don't need to. I wish I could have decided it already, but I have given you a little small glimpse of what my docket and life is looking like these days. So I will get to that as soon as I can. There are only so many hours in the day, and my focus right now obviously needs to be on resolving issues in connection with the upcoming trial, so hopefully I will resolve that sooner rather than later and that will break the logjam, if you will, at least on that category of cases.

Beyond that, I guess the question is, what else is there to discuss? At the last conference I had raised a couple

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issues that we didn't get a chance to discuss because I had to leave. One was whether there is any need or it would be helpful to have something along the lines of the intensive settlement protocols that Judge Selna had implemented or used in the Toyota case. Here, I think the sense I got from the brief discussion we had is that everybody thought things are thus far proceeding relatively smoothly and there may not be a need for that just yet, but Ms. Bloom wasn't here, and in any event, we didn't have time to get into the particulars.

I'd also raised the question that we didn't get to at all with respect to how we should proceed with respect to the category -- I haven't checked the most recent letter to see if it's still 349 -- but the plaintiffs who assert ignition switch-related claims in nonignition switch-recalled vehicles. I guess the question in my mind is, are there really common issues in those cases, are they all one-off cases, is there anything that can be done in the context of the MDL as opposed to, you know, trying them or adjudicating them individually, are they within the scope of the settlement discussions that are ongoing, so on and so forth. And I guess I don't entirely even understand what that category means. As I understand it, they're essentially cars that were not recalled in connection with all these recalls but allegations are nonetheless being made with respect to ignition switch issues in them, is that correct?

So I don't know what order you want to take these issues up in, but those are the things that I wanted to flag.

MR. GODFREY: Your Honor, I think the parties suggested that we would be having a meet-and-confer to discuss a number of these things. Ms. Bloom can address this, and I may have some comments on settlement when we get to that topic.

THE COURT: You've got to speak up and more slowly. I didn't understand what you just said and I'm sure the court reporter didn't either. Say again?

MR. GODFREY: Fair enough. I think that we had suggested in the status agenda letter that we would be having a meet-and-confer to discuss a number of these topics, and I think that rather than basically take the Court's time this morning without having thought through what might make sense, we should have that meet-and-confer with our counterparties. As to the settlement question, I think Ms. Bloom can comment on that. I may have some additional comments when we get to the settlement portion of the agenda. But my suggestion to the Court is, we understand the question, and I think that it would be better, from our perspective — unless the Court wants us to hypothesize other alternatives, I think it would be better for us to have a meet-and-confer and have an organized presentation to address the Court's more specific question. That would be my suggestion to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. That's fine with me.

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Mr. Hilliard, given that, I'm not sure you need to be heard, but --

MR. HILLIARD: I think you were moving towards the big remaining elephant in the room, Judge, and that's the prebankruptcy dockets. They're pretty robust. I know that the Hilliard-Henry docket and a few others are either going to need to be tried or disposed of in some way. I know that to date General Motors has clearly said, look, we're not saying we're not interested, we're just saying we're just not interested now. So I wanted to be sure the Court's aware that they're not being ignored either by General Motors or by my insistent discussions with General Motors about, let's talk about these, but sooner or later they have to go somewhere and be addressed, either on a one-off basis because they're all -- they've all been bellwethered, and they're simply pre '09 accidents, so these are folks who are still waiting to address how that might relate with the first question of the day, which is, what's going on with the bankruptcy in regards to settlement? How does this affect this MDL? You know, my sense is there is a little bit of inertia in regards to the EL cases because of the trial that sat in December. The special master, Layn Phillips, now has a date with the EL team to discuss whether or not there's a mechanism to resolve those cases prior to the December trial study. And my other sense is that sooner or later the buckets of cases that are prebankruptcy and that are

injury and death will likely be addressed by General Motors, and my suggestion to them is, you know, makes some sense to do it in conjunction with the EL, since there is a court-appointed special master. That said, I've been very successful both with Ms. Bloom and Mr. Brock and Mr. Dreyer in discussing dockets of cases without help from a mediator. I've found them to be both attentive and reactive, once they get the greenlight from their client, but right now, you know, they've been pretty clear that that greenlight has yet to come as to those dockets of cases.

THE COURT: All right. And there are a few things packed in there that I want to respond to.

First is, it doesn't feel from my end that there's inertia on any front in this MDL, but that's neither here nor there.

Second is, I think by term -- I'd have to look at the order of appointment -- that Mr. Phillips was appointed solely with respect to the economic loss claims. Now I had floated at the last conference whether he could be used in connection with personal injury/wrongful death cases and indicated that you all should discuss that and perhaps address it in your proposal, and then the proposed order did limit it to economic loss. So at the moment those are the terms of his appointment. Now it may be that at some point down the road that could or should be revisited and the scope of his appointment should be expanded.

There's obviously, as I mentioned at the last

conference, also Judge Cott, who could be available in individual instances to help. But I did want to just note that.

And then the last question I have is, well, I'm trying to think of how the presale order cases on the one hand — there's no difference substantively between them and postsale order cases. It's just a function of the date of the accident. And in that regard, you know, to the extent that we've bellwethered cases from Phase I or Categories A, B, or C or what have you, I would think that those are serving the same function with respect to those pools of cases as they are with respect to the postsale order. I guess the question I have is, are there issues with respect to the bankruptcy litigation and appeals that are either pending before me or being briefed before me that have a bearing on settlement in those cases, and if so, can you flag those for me. I guess I'm just trying to figure out what, if anything, is holding those cases up at this point.

MR. HILLIARD: I believe that's a back table question, Judge.

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. GODFREY: We're conferring, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I mean, the other option is, you could put this within the scope of the things that you're going to confer with --

MR. GODFREY: Yes.

MS. BLOOM: That's exactly what I was suggesting, yes, is that we'll address your issue about the interplay of the two courts and the prebankruptcy cases in that five-page letter, your Honor.

THE COURT: I was actually thinking that you should address it in the context of your discussions about essentially where we're going on all the personal injury/wrongful death cases and settlement/remand/, you know, intensive settlement protocols and so forth.

MR. GODFREY: Ms. Bloom and I were debating that, as your Honor observed, and I always lose out when I debate with Ms. Bloom, so I think we'll note it in the letter that we file about the interplay with bankruptcy, but I think the meet-and-confer is the better way to go here to at least have a structure to this discussion that might be helpful to the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. I think that's right. And I think in the context of that meet-and-confer, number one, again, you should talk about the intensive settlement idea, and I don't mean to be suggesting that I have a view that it is appropriate here or not. It may not be. I'm just trying to figure out what, if anything, I can do to move things along. But second, and it may be that the way New GM has framed the different categories in its update letter is the way to go, but it would

be helpful I think to take a step back and look at each of those categories, and I know on Category B, for example, that what you need is a ruling from me, but with respect to the other categories, you know, just sort of talk amongst yourselves on each side separately, individually, and then together about sort of where you see these cases heading, you know, whether and when remand might be appropriate, whether the presale order cases are different in any way, and if there are any issues that I can or should resolve to deal with those and what have you. I guess I'm just trying to get a sense of what I can do to sort of move each of those categories forward.

Again, I understand Category B, what the answer to that is, but I don't have as good a sense with respect to some of these other categories.

MR. GODFREY: I think what the Court is really asking us is whether at the current time the parties can outline for the Court a path to what we refer to as the end game resolution for the MDL, and I don't know whether we're at that stage yet or not, but I think that's what you're really asking, because all these specific questions that the Court has raised really, when you package them together, ask the ultimate question, what does this look like and how do we resolve it, over what period of time, and what's the expense, and it may be premature to identify the precise path, although we are very far along after three years and we certainly should have that discussion, and I

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think that's what you're really asking, unless I'm missing the point of the Court's questions.

THE COURT: No, that is exactly what I'm asking. what I'm suggesting is it might be helpful to discuss that in the context of each of these categories. So say for Phase I cases, you know, my sense is, the bellwether process has run its course, you guys suggested that you had what you needed on that front, and for the most part my understanding is that those cases are now essentially in settlement discussions and New GM has been prioritizing cases or lawyers who have multiple cases, and sort of where that stands, where you see that headed, how long you think that process should be allowed to play out before cases start to get remanded, because if there's nothing further for me to do in that category, then I think that is the next step, after giving you whatever appropriate time you need to try and resolve them before we remand, or, if I'm wrong about that, what else we should be doing in that category.

And then for example, with respect to these nonignition switch or ignition switch-related claims and nonignition switch vehicles, you know, what that category involves. You know, do you envision a bellwether process with respect to those cases, are there common issues among them or are they really one-off issues, is there anything to be done here that we haven't already done, and so forth. And then with

respect to the presale order cases, is there anything specific to those cases, you know, and in particular is there anything that I should be doing that I haven't already done and could do and are there any rulings that I should be making or prioritizing that would help you kind of expedite and move the process along as to each of these categories. Those are the kinds of questions that I would love your thoughts on and I think we should aim to discuss at the next status conference.

So if you want, maybe a week before the next status conference, to submit something on that, like a joint letter, I would think a joint letter could be feasible. What are your thoughts?

MR. HILLIARD: That's fine with us, Judge.

One other thought is, should Mr. Phillips be amenable and GM be amenable, and the economic loss plaintiffs are also amenable, if the Court would allow us to submit an amended order inviting the personal injury and wrongful death plaintiff docket to that mediation.

MS. CABRASER: Your Honor, Elizabeth Cabraser. From the standpoint of the economic loss plaintiffs, what we need to consider, and we will consider that, is, Mr. Phillips' appointment is to focus on economic loss three years into the litigation. We hope he'll be able to do that as a priority. We can see how things developed. I appreciate Mr. Godfrey's statement about an overall end game. We're all starting to

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think about that. We'll see how things develop, but the one thing I wouldn't want to see is for us to lose the little bit of momentum we have with Mr. Phillips, who's given us a date after coordinating his very complicated and busy schedule as an in-demand mediator and our schedules. So we'll take that under advisement, but at this point we'd request that the order remain in place.

THE COURT: Well, I'm certainly not amending it as we sit here now, but it's something that you all should discuss amongst yourselves. And I would say I share Ms. Cabraser's concern -- I'll put it that way -- that, you know, I think I did agree with lead counsel that a mediator was appropriate at this juncture, in particular with respect to the economic loss claims, because I felt that the time was ripe on that side of things and the progress was ongoing on the personal injury/wrongful death side and therefore less necessary, but that having a mediator involved would perhaps jump-start things on the economic loss side, and I remain of that view, which is another way of saying that I do think that should be his priority, and my only hesitation about expanding the scope of his appointment would be if that somehow distracted him or, you know, made it more difficult for him to kind of focus and prioritize the economic loss things. But if, based on your discussions with one another and with him, it seems that he could be helpful on the personal injury/wrongful death side of

things and it wouldn't detract from his ability to be helpful on the economic loss side of things, then I don't think I have any objection or problem in principle to expanding the scope of the appointment. But that's my primary concern and, relatedly, whether it's as necessary because I think progress is being made. But I think these are among the issues to discuss in the context of the sort of end game discussions which Mr. Godfrey has alluded to.

So why don't you submit a joint letter addressing all these issues one week in advance of the next status conference and then we can discuss them as needed at that time and decide how to proceed.

I had also raised, and we didn't get to in the last conference, the question of whether there are other cases like the Anglin case, that is, presale order cases that had been closed because of the bankruptcy proceedings and essentially not reopened. I don't know if you know the answer to that or if there's anything to be done on that other than just sort of wait and see if any plaintiff's lawyers wake up and suddenly realize that they might have an issue on that score.

Anyone have anything they want to say?

MR. HILLIARD: One of the things that have come up in bankruptcy, Judge, is that sooner or later, should there be an agreement found to exist between Guck and the plaintiffs, that the notice that Guck is proposing with information provided by

GM would be very, very broad and would include notice of, if you have a personal injury or wrongful death claim or an accident that occurred in any of these vehicles, you may have a claim. Frankly, other than that, I have not gotten, received calls or — like we did early on in this litigation from lawyers and said, we have one, what do we do and where do we go. But in discussing with the other side in bankruptcy court about the purpose of the notice, they wanted it to be brought, and there may be a client or a customer that gets the notice of the Guck settlement, if it ever occurs and if notice ever goes out at that level, where they might appear and say, I didn't know that there was a defect and here I am.

THE COURT: Well, that's a different issue, and I really don't want to get into that. I think Anglin, if I remember the circumstances correctly, was a case where a suit was filed but the plaintiff essentially consented to either dismissal or closing of the case because of the bankruptcy court's ruling and then post the Second Circuit ruling essentially said, hey, you know, now we want to reopen the case. And my question is, are there other cases that are actually lawsuits that have been filed that would fall within that category that we should be mindful of or not? I'm not interested in lawyers or potential plaintiffs who haven't yet realized they might have a claim. I think there are all sorts of issues there, and I don't want to get into them. And it may

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be that we should just leave things be and if other lawyers pop up like Anglin, we'll deal with them when they pop up. But maybe there's no need to figure that out yet.

MR. HILLIARD: I don't know of any right now.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'll leave that be.

Anything else on the settlement front to report? I infer that things are proceeding with respect to Mr. Phillips, and I heard a December 1 date that you have at least a preliminary meeting, is that correct?

MS. CABRASER: That's correct, your Honor. That's been set for Newport Beach, I believe.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GODFREY: December 1 with Judge Phillips in California, next week Mr. Berman and I are seeing each other a lot. We're having a mediation in Orange County. Don't know whether that will result in anything or not.

And then we may -- I guess I'd say stay tuned.

There's something else that in the not-too-distant future we may be able to bring the Court to by way of settlement. We're not yet there and see whether it takes place, but it's moving in the right direction.

THE COURT: That's tantalizing. Okay. Anything you do want to tell me?

MR. GODFREY: It's a small marker, your Honor. I just don't like surprises for the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else that you want to actually share or -- all right. Very good.

Anything else? Any new business? Otherwise, I think we need to talk about the next date.

MR. GODFREY: There was one other thing, your Honor.

And I really hate to raise this because of your Honor's comments earlier. It's not about the topic you've been clear you don't want to talk about, so I'll just start by saying that. I did want to remind the Court that under the Court's prior briefing schedule, we're filing our benefit of the bargain summary judgment motion on plaintiff's claimed economic loss damages this Friday. And so I know the Court's seen a lot of briefs and I didn't want you to think we're just operating —

THE COURT: I am well aware of that. I am aware of that, I'm aware of the motion to amend, I'm aware of the motion to remand in one of the member cases, I'm aware of the supplemental briefing in the successor liability claims, I'm aware of the 19 bankruptcy appeals that are either fully submitted or on their way to being fully submitted. I am well aware of all of that, believe me.

MR. GODFREY: I just didn't want to be --

THE COURT: The bearer of bad news?

MR. GODFREY: I'll just sit down then, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mind you, I don't mean to chill you from

filing things that actually do warrant being filed, but I just want you to be a little sensitive to the situation.

All right. Next status conference, we have a final pretrial conference in connection with Scruggs on October 25th. We could to some extent, I suppose, address MDL-related issues in that context, but that's not too far off, and I know the Orange County trial was within days of that and therefore all of you may not be here, so I guess the question I have is when we ought to reconvene. And then we obviously have the trial. So any thoughts?

MR. BERMAN: On our side of the table, we're thinking after Thanksgiving, sometime after Thanksgiving. And I know that we're going to be here in the bankruptcy court on December 4^{th} , so maybe the 5^{th} ?

Oh, the final pretrial for bankruptcy is the 5^{th} . Well, somewhere around that, either the day before or the day after. I think we're all in town.

THE COURT: So I have a trial in another matter scheduled for the $6^{ ext{th}}$, meaning the $4^{ ext{th}}$ might be better on my end. Is that --

MR. GODFREY: The 4th would work for us, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BERMAN: Sold.

MS. CABRASER: Sold, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So December 4th, 9:30, the

usual time.

And in addition to the usual agenda letter, you'll be filing a week before that this letter on sort of settlement and end game issues writ large. Anything else?

MR. BROCK: I have one extraordinary request on the scheduling. I think I have this right, that our next trial is scheduled to begin on Thursday, November the 2nd?

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. BROCK: And I wanted to inquire if it would be possible for us to conduct our pretrial conference maybe Monday of that week once we're all here, unless you feel like that is too late in time to do it, but --

THE COURT: Well, unfortunately, you're forgetting the reason that the start date was postponed to Thursday, which is that I'm in Florida for the MDL conference Monday through Wednesday. So unless you all want to do it in Palm Beach, I think --

MS. SMITH: That would be fine, your Honor.

MR. GODFREY: We can work with that schedule, actually, your Honor.

MR. BROCK: That would be easier for me.

The reason for my request is I'm taking my grandchildren to Disneyworld that week, that last week in October. But I will work it out.

THE COURT: All right. The other thing is -- well,

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yes. We'll leave it as is. I apologize for not being able to accommodate you on that.

Anything else?

MR. SHEPARD: Briefly, your Honor, to go back to the issue from the Scruggs trial, the Court heard argument earlier today about the issue of whether certain opinions by

Dr. Keepers and Lo, whether plaintiff had somehow waived those opinions in the Daubert response brief. That argument was raised by New GM last night in their reply letter for the Court and there has been argument, but I wanted to offer the Court, just to let the Court know that it has not been briefed in the Daubert motion. So when your Honor turns to those, this issue of waiver isn't going to be presented in written form. And I'd request the ability to brief that, and I can work out a schedule with opposing counsel, so your Honor has something on that issue in writing. It's an important issue and it hasn't yet been fully briefed.

THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to entertain that just yet. I'll look at the briefs myself. I mean, I think the briefs are what the briefs are, and if you didn't respond to an argument, then I think it's therefore been waived or unopposed. I'm not going to give you another opportunity to brief it. So what's done is done.

All right. Just a reminder that on the 25th we're set to start at 9:00, not 9:30, and I'll be interrupting the

conference to address the prospective jurors whenever they are convened. So I will see some of you at 9:00 on the 25^{th} . I will be hearing from all of you in one form or another, I'm sure, and I'll see most of you in December.

So we are adjourned, and have a pleasant day.

ALL COUNSEL: Thank you, your Honor.

THE LAW CLERK: All rise.