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I27TGMC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 IN RE: GENERAL MOTORS LLC IGNITION SWITCH LITIGATION, 4 14 MD 2543 (JMF) 5 Conference New York, N.Y. 6 February 7, 2018 7 2:30 p.m. 8 Before: 9 HON. JESSE M. FURMAN, 10 District Judge 11 **APPEARANCES** 12 LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN AND BERNSTEIN LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs 13 BY: RACHEL GEMAN 14 HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs BY: STEVE W. BERMAN 15 HILLIARD MUNOZ GONZALES LLP 16 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 17 BY: ROBERT C. HILLIARD KATRINA ASHLEY 18 BAILEY PEAVY BAILEY 19 Attorneys for Plaintiffs BY: K. CAMP BAILEY 20 KEN BAILEY 21 KIRKLAND & ELLIS, LLP Attorneys for Defendant 22 BY: RICHARD GODFREY RENEE SMITH 23 24 25

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THE COURT: Good afternoon. This is Judge Furman. I think we are now live. Let me ask who is on the line for plaintiffs, if you could -- maybe one person could identify who is on the line or we could go in order.

MR. HILLIARD: Judge, good afternoon, this is Bob
Hilliard. I think you just turned the call live, so I don't
know that anyone on the line knows who else is on the line, so
I can't really identify anyone else except Steve Berman who
sent me an email and commented on the music.

THE COURT: My understanding is you, Mr. Hilliard, is on the line, Mr. Berman is on the line, Ms. Gemen is on the line, and Ken Bailey is also on the line, is that correct?

MR. BAILEY: Yes, Ken Bailey and Camp Bailey are here, sir.

THE COURT: All right. And Katrina Ashley is also on the line?

MS. ASHLEY: Yes, your Honor, Katrina Ashley is on.

THE COURT: Anyone else for plaintiffs?

All right. And what about for new GM?

MR. GODFREY: Good afternoon, your Honor, this is Rick Godfrey with Renee Smith and Allan Pixton and we're all sitting here together in the conference room.

THE COURT: Great. Good afternoon to all of you.

Did I miss anyone with speaking privileges?

Just a reminder, since we're on the phone and not physically present, we do have a court reporter here. Just identify yourself when you say anything so that the record is clear as to who is speaking. I can recognize most of your voices at this point, but the court reporter certainly can't.

So thanks for convening on short notice. I did want to move forward on these issues sooner rather than later, so rather than await the next conference or try to get you all together, I figured we should proceed in this fashion.

Let me tell you my thoughts on where I stand, having read the three letters. First of all, I will grant new GM's motion to file a reply. I'm not sure how significant or important it was in the mix of things, but I certainly don't see any reason not to consider it.

To make a long story short — actually I'm not going to make it short at all, but I don't think that there's a clear sort of right or legal answer here, and think it's pretty clear, given the range of precedence out there, that I have broad discretion on how to structure things in my decision both with respect to case management and also the appropriate time for remands or transfers more generally.

I have no doubt that keeping the cases before me will certainly help to promote additional settlements, and I have no doubt on that score that new GM continues to make diligent efforts to settle as many of these cases as possible and many

more settlements will be coming down the pike. I don't think that that reason alone would justify keeping the cases before me if otherwise there would be no efficiencies gained in having them consolidated.

To put that another way, I think my view is that, settlement aside, if all we had was case specific discovery and case specific motion practice to be done and no economy of scale in keeping them together, then I do think it would make sense to remand or transfer them, as the case may be, that that would be the more efficient way to ensure that each case is moved forward as expeditiously as possible.

Candidly, I have a hard time telling where on the spectrum that I just described this case lies at this point. I think it's a hard thing to tell. I think there's no question that the vast majority of kind of the common work has been done through the common discovery, through the bellwether process, through the different buckets of cases that we have already identified and are moving forward on with respect to order number 140.

Having said that, I am inclined, at least for now, and I want to emphasize that and I will come back to it, to agree with new GM that there is more work that can and should be done within the MDL to both promote settlement but also to identify and essentially sort, as I said, the wheat from the -- separate the wheat from the chaff. That is to say, to identify cases

that really have no business going forward or no business being in the MDL, and more generally to advance cases toward resolution, recognizing, as I said before, that case specific discovery is going to happen or has to happen, whether it happens before me or in the transferor court.

Given that, given the ongoing efforts pursuant to order number 140 to sort of sort through different buckets of the cases, I am inclined to and do agree with new GM that they should remain here for now, and therefore am not going to reconsider what I think had pretty much been my decision earlier that we were not yet at the time for remand.

But having said that, I want to be clear that I'm not committing myself to hold onto each and every one of these cases until each and every case is literally trial ready, nor am I committing myself to following through, and I'll have more to say on this in a moment, a plan that involved multiple waves of cases. That is to say I'm not committing myself to following through on waves two, three, et cetera, if I decide, based on experience, based on where things stand and how the litigation is proceeding, that it makes more sense to change course.

And I'm certainly not committing myself to deciding one hundred separate motions or anything of that sort. I think the question will arise when the time comes for motion practice, if there's some sort of omnibus or consolidated basis

on which to proceed, or common issues that I can resolve, and that there's efficiencies to be gained in presenting to me as opposed to presenting to dozens of other judges, then I think I would be inclined to entertain that. If we're talking about very case specific, fact specific motions with individual cases, then not only do I not see anything gained by me handling them all, but I think it would take me months if not years to resolve them, and at that point it's easier to farm them out to separate judges.

So the bottom line is I will stay the course for now, but I will continue to evaluate on an ongoing basis where the litigation stands on the spectrum that I described earlier, that is to say, whether there are efficiencies to be gained by proceeding in a consolidated fashion within the MDL or whether it makes more sense to remand or transfer cases. And in that regard, it's not all or nothing. Obviously I can make a decision that some cases are appropriate for remand or transfer and not all.

And that will depend on a variety of factors that I just described, that is to say how much progress is being made on settlement, my determination of whether I add any value above and beyond what other judges would add with less familiarity with the litigation and the underlying issues, whether there are common arguments or issues that would resolve or move forward multiple cases and so forth. And again, that

may change over time, or my understanding of where things are may change over time.

So having said all of that, I am confronted with really only one proposal that moves things forward along those lines, and that is new GM's proposal. And for that reason and because I'm generally okay with it, I am going to adopt it and leave to you guys to actually memorialize it in the form of an order. But number one, there are a few modifications that I want to make to it, and number two, again, I want to reiterate or reemphasize that in saying that I'm not necessarily committing myself to carrying through the plan to its utter complete 100 percent conclusion, that is to say complete discovery on every individual case.

So number one, I generally agree to the sort of wave approach, and in that regard I sort of treat the first wave as a bit of a bellwether in the sense that, again, as it proceeds as we get to the end of it in particular I will be in a better position to understand and evaluate whether this process makes sense, whether there's value to be added by me keeping these cases or not. So in that regard, you should treat the wave as sort of something of a test case for whether it make sense to stay this course.

I agree that the first wave should be one hundred cases from the category we're talking about, but mindful of the examples given in Mr. Hilliard's letter, that is the examples

of sort of the cases that talk tug on the heartstrings a little bit, I would be inclined to give lead counsel an opportunity to choose some number of cases based on hardship considerations, that is, things like financial circumstances of the plaintiffs involved, the age of plaintiffs involved, the nature of the injuries involved or the like for inclusion in the first wave, that is to say, provide for some number of cases of that sort and not rely solely on the order in which cases were filed.

So what I would propose is that the default is the hundred cases to be in the first wave would be the hundred first filed cases as new GM proposes, but that the plaintiff's lead counsel would have the right to replace up to 15 of those cases beginning with the one hundredth in order and working backwards with quote unquote 15 hardship cases of their choice, that is unilateral choice on plaintiffs.

Anyone wish to be heard on that?

All right.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$ GODFREY: Your Honor, this is Rick Godfrey, new GM is agreeable to that.

THE COURT: Mr. Hilliard?

MR. HILLIARD: Judge, I wanted to make some general comments, but I'm going to wait until the end and tell you on your specific question I looked hard at GM's proposal on what they want do, but I don't think now is the time to comment on that, given what the Court intends to do, and I respect where

you want us to go.

What I would like to do is be sure that 15 would be enough on the hardship issues, because it is a real issue for people who are aging or who for some other reason need to cut in front of the line, so to speak.

So subject to perhaps us being able to make sure that 15 will cover it, first I appreciate you allowing us to do that with the hardship cases, and second, I would like to be sure that that number is appropriate, and if it isn't, I would perhaps address it with GM and see if they agree with me and then advise the Court, but otherwise it seems fair, and thank you for doing it.

THE COURT: Very good. And needless to say, I picked that number not completely at random, I thought it made some sense, but it is semi arbitrary.

So I think if you think, based on your evaluation of the number of cases, a certain number would be appropriate, I just emphasize, and I trust that you would adhere to this, but the point is really to make exceptions for hardship, not to give you an opportunity to cherry pick whatever cases you think would be your strongest cases as things move forward.

So with that understanding, if you think that a larger number than 15 would be appropriate, yes, talk to counsel for new GM. My hope is that you guys could agree on something that would make sense, given the actual particulars, but you could

always get back to me on that.

Second, I agree with new GM's proposal for essentially sort of limited or targeted fact discovery and expert discovery, and on the latter in particular, that each plaintiff should be required to submit expert reports for any expert that he or she believes is necessary to establish accident causation, I will call it, and must make that expert available for deposition. I do think that that makes sense for the reasons described by new GM and have taken into consideration plaintiff's response on that.

Third, I generally agree with the proposed schedule, that is, I recognize today I think was the date that new GM had proposed to come up with the preliminary list of one hundred, and I'm assuming that that is not a feasible thing at this point. But what I would like you guys to do is I want -- basically I think you should aim to have the process of limited discovery that we just discussed or I just described done by mid to late August, which is what new GM contemplated in its proposed schedule. If you want to work backwards from there and figure out based on that when the list of one hundred should be settled upon, I think that would make sense. I would imagine that the list should be settled in the next week or so, and hopefully we can make up for lost time.

I am not, however, at the moment going to commit to entertaining dispositive and/or Daubert motions in all of these

first wave cases. Consistent with what I said a few minutes ago, I think it make more sense to defer decision on how to proceed on that front until the end, or at least near the end of discovery to see essentially what we are dealing with.

In that regard, I think it's akin to how I decide to proceed on the order 140 categories of cases. I think if some sort of omnibus motion practice is viable, that is to say GM provides me with a colorable argument that would dispose of a number of cases or common issues in cases, that might be appropriate and a viable option. But if, again, we're talking about one hundred separate fact specific, case specific motions, I may decide at that point a remand or transfer is the more logical option than my trying to work my way through one hundred separate motions.

Two other things on this front. One is I'm not going to appoint a special master for now. I may come to regret that, but if I do, I may change my mind. That is to say it may come to that, but I think, first of all, I would be inclined to have a better record before I go down that path, and a better record as well of what the special master's responsibilities or needs would be.

Second, I tend to be of the view that lawyers are less likely to raise stupid issues, if I could call them that, with me, if they understand that it means bothering me than they would if there were a special master in the picture or even a

magistrate judge. For those reasons, and consistent with how I handled things way back when we started discovery in the MDL generally, I will keep the issues for now myself.

Now if it becomes too onerous, I may, unless

Magistrate Judge Cott in some fashion -- and if need be, I can,
as I said, always revisit the question of whether appointing a
special master is the way to go. So for now, however, I will
stay the course that we have been on.

Second, I agree with new GM that any misjoined wave one cases or claims, if I could call them that, should be severed and refiled, but I think that it probably makes sense to coordinate the deadline for doing so with essentially the process that we have already in place, and that is underway with respect to order number 140 and the Hilliard Henry withdrawal motions and so forth. That is to say, we already have several — any number of cases that are going through some process that may result in severance or amendment or voluntary dismissal, and my guess is it would probably make sense, number one, to let that process run its course, or number two, and this may be a footnote to what I said before, it may make sense to deviate from the hundred cases based on time of filing and hardship to also carve out perhaps ones that may not ultimately go very far in light of the order 140 process.

So that is my thinking on that piece of your letters. I also would like you -- well, my inclination is for now, at

least, to set a deadline, if we're looking at concluding the discovery process on wave one by mid or late August. I would think it would make sense, as we get close to that date, so maybe by August 1, to have a proposal from both sides with respect to -- or sort of see where things stand and, number one, get your views on what we have learned from the process with wave one with an eye toward how I should handle those cases, and number two, get your respective views on wave two and whether we should be proceeding in the same fashion with wave two, whether we have learned anything that would justify a different decision with respect to wave two, and setting a schedule for that, if appropriate.

Anyone wish to be heard on this front?

MR. HILLIARD: This is Bob Hilliard.

At the end of the process would it help the Court to also have General Motors' expert report when you're trying to decide where you are and what to do with the first hundred one? Because sooner or later if you send it to its home court, we'll have a right to get that the expert report, and I would guess if there's going to be a vehicle inspection and a subsequent expert report it makes sense to have both experts there at the same time and then have GM ultimately provide both us and the Court their views of the liability through an expert.

THE COURT: So I think I said that I considered your arguments on that front in your letter and was inclined not to

go that route. I mean my thinking — and I think this is along the lines of what new GM proposed in its letter is, in essence, if there are motions to be made at the end of this process, they would presumably be summary judgment motions made by new GM either on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to proffer an expert in a case and expert testimony is required, or akin to the airbag deployment cases that for some reason the proposed expert should be precluded under Daubert, leaving that particular plaintiff with no expert, and therefore, the case would need to be dismissed.

I guess what I'm struggling to understand is what -while obviously GM would need to designate an expert and
produce an expert report if the case were headed to trial, how
it would advance things before -- in other words, how it would
give rise to a motion that would potentially be sensible for me
to resolve as opposed to letting that be something that is done
afterwards, I guess.

MR. HILLIARD: Look at it from this way, let's say another court had the MDL and they sent a case to your court after the MDL was over, you would be faced with a plaintiff's case coming into your court with the expert report from the plaintiffs but not yet GM.

Though it may not be important to what you're going to do with the case on remand once the plaintiff's experts report gets them past Daubert, if it does, it seems to me that just to

not waste more time or double the efforts that while we are getting our vehicle inspection done or while whatever plaintiff is getting his vehicle inspection done with his expert and report, that GM participate in preparing the report, too, their report or their reply — and if the remand goes and the case survives all dispositive motions, then it would simply be ready to go to trial sooner rather than later after remand.

Again, I'm putting it out there for discussion purposes in regards to make sure that more time is not spent before the plaintiffs are either in trial or the case is settled or the case goes away for dispositive reasons.

THE COURT: I guess what I'm thinking is if I'm a transferor judge -- let's say I do remand a case, the case survives this process and I remand it, presumably, if nothing further were done within the MDL, I will tell that judge we have done limited discovery on accident causation but the parties may have additional witnesses that they want to depose on that front, we also haven't done any discovery with respect to injuries and medical costs and the like, medical discovery, and in addition, new GM's expert discovery hasn't proceeded; figure out all that and schedule all that. And it's not clear to me that it would materially change things to defer GM's accident causation expert to that phase, but maybe I'm wrong.

Mr. Hilliard?

MR. HILLIARD: Except the clear line seems to be

liability versus damages. And if it gets remanded with an order to you, to the home court saying here are my orders, here's what I believe where the case is, the only thing that's left is fact specific medical testimony and damages, all causation liability on both sides have been done.

And Judge Furman, I'm not suggesting that the Court's idea in regards to where you want to go with the first wave needs adjusting for the first wave purposes, I'm simply wondering if we do both the causation experts now and it does get remanded, there's going to likely be a quicker ability to finally get to trial if that's where that specific case is headed.

THE COURT: I hear you on that.

Mr. Godfrey, anything you want to say?

MR. GODFREY: Your Honor, I think your instincts were correct. The goal here was to position these cases for settlement, if possible, as quickly as possible, or to tee up dispositive motions because they either don't have an expert or their expert cannot establish causation.

Having GM provide an expert report is not going to advance the ball in the transfer, or if the Court ultimately decides to remand it, by even a single day, given all the other witnesses that will have to be deposed and the other fact discovery that will have to be done. There's no purpose to it in terms of what we are trying to achieve in light of the last

status conference on January 8, which is to cull the cases down to those cases that have merit, in our view, versus those that don't have merit, in our view, and obviously the Court will decide whether our view is correct or not.

But the addition of an expert by new GM isn't going to advance the ball by a single day. Because the way this works -- and your Honor knows this as well I do -- once you transfer the cases, they're assigned to a judge, they will have a status, look at all the stuff that has to be done, and the expert discovery, to the extent there's undone expert discovery, and the plaintiff's part or defendants part will be done at the same time, and it will not pick up a single day. What it will do is impose unnecessary cost, and it will not help us at this time in terms of what we're trying to achieve and I think what the Court has directed us to try to achieve. So as I start my comments, I agree with your instincts and I think I have given my position in response to the question you asked.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hilliard, go ahead.

MR. HILLIARD: Just briefly, Judge. So I see it not as a one-way street. The tension is, as the Court started to really recognize, is when is delay unreasonable? And delay is just tied into an MDL sometimes but it's necessary in order to get a document done.

And I disagree with Mr. Godfrey, respectfully to him,

that having them be required to produce their expert reports now will not trim some of the subsequent delay. I can appreciate what he's telling you. He's telling you get the plaintiff's report to us, then either dismiss the case or we'll settle it, but in reality, the second part of that equation doesn't always happen as is indicated by Mr. Bailey who is on the phone and what's going on with his docket right now.

So again, I think the Court -- what you want us to do is make sense, and we're going to do it. I would just ask the Court to consider that this is not just for settlement purposes, and I don't know if the Court was, again, by example, remanded to the Southern District of New York, Judge Furman's Court, and you had one single case, if there would be less delay than otherwise by having still GM expert needing to do inspections, needing to do reports and needing to be deposed versus just the plaintiffs and the medical doctors. Only reflecting on the tension of the delay as it builds over time.

THE COURT: All right. I hear you. And I think, if I haven't made it clear, I am certainly sensitive to your argument that justice delayed is justice denied and eager to really move this forward, as I said, more aggressively than reasonably at this point.

I think I'm inclined to stick with my initial inclinations and to agree with Mr. Godfrey that when push comes to shove, while there's some attraction to being able to say to

a transferor judge that liability discovery is basically done and all you need to do is damages, but when push comes to shove a transferor court would be able to schedule this in a way that the need for expert discovery from GM would not add a single day to the schedule.

So I think this probably makes sense. I will think about it and can always revisit it. I can also, come August or September or whenever we figure out where these cases stand, it may pay at that point to proceed as to some number of cases on the expert front with respect to GM, but I think for now I will stick with my initial inclinations.

Anything else to be said on what I have discussed?

MR. BAILEY: Your Honor, this is Ken Bailey, if I could speak for a moment.

THE COURT: You may. Why don't you tell me where things with your situation.

MR. BAILEY: First of all, it's my understanding from what I have learned from various people, we have the largest group of GM cases out there that haven't been settled. I don't know what or how many of these hundreds cases that we have that we're going to have to be forced with the order that the judge is going to submit. I have been focusing, per your previous hearing, on getting ready for a mediation on Friday. It was actually supposed to be today but GM elected to postpone it I guess for this hearing. I'm going to have to spend more time

on evaluating what the burden of these expenses are going to be on my clients. So that's going to be factored into any settlement amounts that I could even offer to GM.

I just am concerned, again, about the burden that I have to my client to go out there and start the discovery process. I just want the Court to be aware of that. I would like the ability, with your permission, sir, to come back and advise you of what the burden is going to be, if possible. It may not have any impact, but I would like to request the opportunity to do that. And I just think it's — this is just my opinion, sir, that this is a unilateral expense that is being thrown on my clients, and we'll do what the Court provide for us to do, sir.

THE COURT: I hear you, and thank for sharing your thoughts on that. Obviously, I would always obviously give you an opportunity to be heard, since Mr. Hilliard is lead counsel for purposes of the personal injury/wrongful death cases, confer with him before submitting anything to me on the theory that there may be broader interests at stake, and you can coordinate things as appropriate, but if need be, you could always submit something to me.

I guess the only reaction I have, you should proceed with the mediation, and I will keep my fingers crossed that that is fruitful for both sides, I guess, and I think under order 140 you're supposed to report back to me by the 15th of

this month with respect to whether the discussion was fruitful and how you want to proceed if not.

The only thing I would say is I recognize and hear what you're saying, but if I were to accept lead counsel's, Mr. Hilliard's, proposal and remand all these cases to the transferor courts, it would presumably involve proceeding full speed ahead with full discovery on each and every one of these cases in potentially far-flung jurisdictions. So while I recognize and hear what you say about costs, the fact of the matter is I think the alternative will ultimately involve potentially greater costs for individual plaintiffs than proceeding under a consolidated fashion here. That's all I will say for now. I hear what you said, and if you wish to be heard further when you have more information, you may do so.

That brings me to the second issue that was discussed in your letters, and that's the category C issue, and specifically whether I should entertain more bellwethers. I do believe that we should have a couple more bellwethers. I think the bottom line is even though you have obviously done discovery with respect to a number of these cases, that it ultimately would be a little more helpful if we actually saw one or two go to trial.

To help ensure that the cases are representative and survive to trial, I do believe that my proposal that the January 8 status conference makes sense, that is to sort of

incorporate an element of choice on my part in what cases are selected for trial.

New GM proposed three modifications to my modified approach. Let me address those. First, new GM proposed that each side pick three cases and then there would be one strike for each side. I will adopt that modification. I think it does provide a modest check in the process and allows for —well, I think it provides a modest check, and that's a good enough reason to have it.

The second proposed modification is that I be required to pick one case from each side, that is to say, to the extent we'll have two trials that one would be a GM pick and one would be a plaintiff pick. I am not going to take that approach. I certainly agree that that should be a factor, maybe even a presumption in the cases that I select for trial, but I think that I should have the flexibility to choose the cases that make the most sense given the posture of the MDL writ large and given the cases in the pool and also agree with lead counsel that an ex-ante requirement could influence the selection of cases at the front end in ways that aren't conducive to the bellwether program. So I assure that I will take into consideration whose picks are which and probably try to have one from each side, but I'm not going lock myself into that ex-ante.

And lastly, I think both sides agree that only the two

cases selected for trial would be subject to discovery, and that there would be a requirement that any case that's part of an omnibus complaint at the moment be severed, and that GM file an answer. I think that that makes sense.

I also do agree, however, with lead counsel that where a new complaint needs to be filed, that is a case severed and refiled, that it should be treated essentially as an amended complaint in the original case, that to say that it should have any affect on the statute of limitations type issues from the filing of a new case. Whether something would be timely would basically be a function of whether it would have been timely if it were filed in the existing case.

Mr. Godfrey, you agree with that?

MR. GODFREY: Your Honor, I could not possibly disagree, I don't think, with that.

THE COURT: Good. Glad to hear that.

MR. GODFREY: I was thinking about it but I could not come up with a reason that would not fail the stupid argument test.

THE COURT: Excellent. You vindicated my view that people are less likely to raise stupid arguments with me.

I guess the question is in terms of giving you marching orders to come up with a proposed order what the best way to proceed is, I think it make sense from our experiences in prior chapters of this to probably choose a trial date or

trial dates and then work backwards from those.

I don't know if you guys have another suggestion or if it's a viable option to chose trial dates now or if you want to caucus with one another and propose a few options for trial date and then we can communicate with you which makes sense and work backwards from there, but what are your thoughts?

MR. GODFREY: Your Honor, I think in light of the need to caucus about the hundred, I think we should work backwards and get with you for our recommendations or suggestions to you within a week from today. Would that work for the Court?

THE COURT: That works for me.

Mr. Hilliard, does that work for you?

MR. HILLIARD: It does. Can you give us an idea of when you would hope we would try these cases, Judge, so we'll have the bookends of what months we're looking at?

THE COURT: Sure. Remind me -- I know some of the earlier letters had some of the statistics in there, but how many months typically it took to work cases up in the prior phases? Anyone have that at their fingerprints?

MR. HILLIARD: Mr. Pixton is on the call and he's usually good for that information, Judge.

MR. PIXTON: Off the top of my head, your Honor, I think it was eleven -- the older ones I haven't checked, but usually about an eleven month time frame.

THE COURT: All right. Well --

MR. GODFREY: Could we try to target November,

December of this year.

THE COURT: That was actually what I was looking at.

MR. GODFREY: I think we can do that. Well, A, I think we know what the Court has directed the parties to do, and B, I certainly think we can get it done by November, December time frame, if that works with the Court.

THE COURT: I think that probably does. Why don't you work on that assumption, maybe one in November, one in January, but work on those assumptions, and if you want -- I don't necessarily think this needs to be done through formal filings on ECF, if you come to -- if you come up with a couple dates that would work on your ends and want to float them by my staff, we could essentially get back to you whether that would work on our end and then you can incorporate that into a proposed order, if that makes sense and would be easier.

MR. GODFREY: I think we can do that, your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else that you guys want to discuss?

MR. HILLIARD: Your Honor, I know that the issue will come up on the bellwether case, and I don't know that there's any way around it, but historically the cases that look like liability, potential damage on GM, are resolved before trial.

We talked to the Court about it, and the Court

commented on if they're bellwether and they could settle those cases, where are we doing bellwether if they know how to evaluate and settle cases? That issue has been almost a hundred percent of the time on the cases that both sides thought would probably end up with a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

I don't know that that's going to change. I don't know if there's any way around it, given when they offer good money plaintiff may want to take good money. But if the purpose is to understand category C overall value, as the Court heard me say, and I'm going to participate in the November trial date, it's fine with me. I don't know that it will really inform ultimately the docket settlements, but maybe something that happens between now and the time that case settles or goes to trial will inform it.

So I will assure the Court I will participate both aggressively and in good faith to do everything I can to get the cases ready and the entire docket settled, but that's a fear of mine in regards to which one is going to get tried, if any, ever.

THE COURT: Right. I hear you, and it's certainly a concern of mine as well. I don't know what there is to do about it, if there's anything to be done about it. I don't think I can order new GM not to make a proposal, and I certainly can't order a particular plaintiff not to accept

something that he or she decides is in his or her interest to accept. But I'm open to suggestions. I will brainstorm on my end and think if there's anything to be done that sort of provides any greater assurances that these cases would actually go to trial, but if you come up with anything --

MR. HILLIARD: Short of a mock trial where you give us the fact pattern and say we'll try this fact pattern just to get a verdict and understand the value, because it's understandable to me that GM will come in before trial on a case where liability is strong, given the facts of the entirety of this tragedy, to settle the cases I don't fault them for it at all. But I do want to keep on the table and keep as a discussion point with the Court the fact that these category C cases are waiting, and if this is really an intent by GM to understand and inform the docket, then it has yet to be borne out. And Mr. Godfrey and his firm, and we're professional friends and I respect them and what they're doing, but I do want to keep this position on the table as we move forward and talk about it.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I hear you.

MR. GODFREY: I guess I would just say that my silence should not be deemed acquiescence. And, of course,

Mr. Hilliard is completely in control of this because he didn't have to make offers going forward with GM in these cases.

THE COURT: I hear both of you, and obviously a

I'm not sure either side bears the blame. If GM is offering up money that the plaintiff is interested in taking it, it is what it is. But I can't think offhand of anything to be done about this problem except to keep our fingers crossed that it doesn't rear its ugly head again. But if either of you guys has any thoughts thinking outside the box or within it, talk to one another and certainly float it to me. I'm open to suggestions and sensitive to the issue.

All right?

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MR. GODFREY: Thank you, Judge.

MR. HILLIARD: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anyone have anything else to say, say who you are first and tell me if there is.

All right. Very good. So Mr. Godfrey, when you said you would get back to me within a week, was that with proposed orders on these fronts as well, or is that sort of the schedule of trial and then work backwards from there?

MR. GODFREY: My intention was to schedule a proposed trial, and with respect to the one hundred I think --

Mr. Pixton, the draft order within about a week, or more time?

MR. PIXTON: Maybe two.

THE COURT: How about this, I think -- my sense is that you should be able to propose an order on the first wave

of the hundred sooner rather than later because that really doesn't require coordinating with us for trial dates. So why don't do you try to do that within the week, and within a week also propose some trial dates, and then you'll have two weeks to propose an order for category C bellwethers.

Does that make sense?

MR. PIXTON: That will work, your Honor.

THE COURT: Great. I thank everybody, and these are important --

MR. HILLIARD: Sorry, your Honor, this is Bob Hilliard.

As you were talking Mr. Godfrey I was trying to think outside the box, because I hadn't really vetted this completely, but I wanted to share it with Mr. Godfrey and you. If there's a way to -- and I will talk to Rick about it, and maybe if you wanted to ever get off the ground, but a type of focused jury trial where the fact pattern is agreed to and a jury in your court is selected to determine, based on a fact pattern liability, and potentially damages, I'm not sure. And I wanted to just drop that into the outside the box gray matter of everybody to see if that would prevent a settlement at the eleventh hour and allow everybody to really get a jury's view of liability and value.

THE COURT: Well, why don't you guys --

MR. GODFREY: We considered that three years ago, and

for good and valid reasons did not accept that at the time, but we'll revisit it.

THE COURT: Why don't you guys talk to one another. I think I floated the idea of summary jury trials three years ago, and I think one or both sides wasn't particularly interested.

I don't know, Mr. Hilliard --

MR. HILLIARD: We are wiser, Judge, now.

THE COURT: And I appreciate that, and think it's important to continually rethink things and learn from the experiences that we have had.

Now your proposal sounds to me like a mock trial exercise and I have some Article III case or controversy issues or concerns there, but I don't think they're really ripe to get into at the moment. Why don't you guys bounce things around and think creatively, and if you have any thoughts I'm open to them, as you know. If we need to rethink things or modify things, then we will.

All right. Thank you. I appreciate you're taking the time, and have a good day.